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FERRETING OUT FAVORITISM:
BRINGING PRETEXT CLAIMS AFTER KELO
Daniel S. Hafetz*
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Kelo v. City of New London
that governments may take one's private property and give it to anotherfor
the purpose of promoting economic development. The Court held that, in
evaluatingFifth Amendment challenges to such takings, courts should defer
to legislative judgments as to what constitutes a valid public purpose.
Critics argue that this decision opened the floodgates to pretextual abuse.
Specifically, they contend that local governments that exercise the eminent
domain power are often motivated by a desire to favor another private
party. After Kelo, courts have struggled to reconcile the decision's general
call for deference to legislative judgments with the majority's and
concurrence's implicit callfor heightened scrutiny of takings claimed to be
motivated by favoritism.
This Note argues that courts should adopt a "process scrutiny"
approach to evaluatingpretext claims whereby courts infer favoritismfrom
a variety of circumstantial evidence arising from the condemnation
process. This Note also draws on a conflict among courts over whether to
apply the Court'splausibilitypleading standardderivedfrom Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly in arguing that permissive review of pretext claims on
the pleadings lends substance to them. This Note builds on pretext case law
in an effort to illustrate the wide variety offactors courts have used to infer
improper motivation. Ultimately, this Note argues that a robust process
scrutiny approachgives teeth to challenges that assert the politicalprocess
is being manipulatedimpermissiblyfor someone's private gain.
INTRODUCTION

In Kelo v. City of New London, I the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed an
expansive interpretation of the eminent domain power, holding that
governments may take one's private property and give it to another for the
purpose of promoting economic development. 2 This decision engendered
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law; A.B., 2002, Princeton
University. I would like to thank Professor Aaron Saiger for advising me through the
writing process. I would also like to thank my wife, Sarah, and my parents, Myra and Fred,
for their love, support, and interest throughout the process. Thanks also to my brothers
Jonathan, David, Joshua, and my sister-in-law, Martha.
1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

2. Id.
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fear across the nation that the Court had so weakened constitutional
protections for private property that anyone's land could now be turned
over to private developers who propose a more profitable use.3 Much of the
negative response to Kelo focuses on what some perceive is the potential
use of eminent domain for the purpose of conferring benefits to private
parties. 4 This specific criticism of Kelo came to the fore in Brooklyn, New
York. There, fifteen property owners sought to enjoin the taking of private
property 5 for the development of the twenty-two-acre Atlantic Yards
Project. 6 Plaintiffs there did not contest Kelo's central tenet that economic
development constitutes a public use. Rather they claimed under Kelo that
the asserted public purpose was a mere pretext for conferring a benefit to a
private party 7-a new claim after Kelo8-in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. 9
Specifically, they claimed that "a 'substantial' motivation of the various
state and local government officials who approved or acquiesced in the
approval of the Project has been to benefit Bruce Ratner, the man whose
company first proposed it and who serves as the Project's primary
3. Adam Liptak, Case Won on Appeal (To Public), N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, at WK3;
see

also DANA BERLINER,

INST. FOR JUSTICE, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: EMINENT DOMAIN

ABUSE
IN
THE
POST-KELO
WORLD
2-3
(2006),
available
at
http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/floodgates-report.pdf (arguing that since
Kelo v. City of New London, there has been significant abuse of the power of eminent
domain).
4. See BERLINER, supra note 3, at 2-5.
5. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2008).
6. Nicholas Confessore, Group Calls for Major Changes in Atlantic Yards Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2006, at B4. As of September 29, 2008, this project was on hold pending
review by the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division. Posting of Charles V.
Bagli to City Room Blog, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/29/atlantic-yardsfaces-another-delay (Sept. 29, 2008, 17:35 EST).
7. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 52-53. In defining pretext, one author writes "[a] pretext is..
a cover for a purpose one wishes to hide." Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091,
1152 (1986) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (Marshall,
C.J.)).
8. See Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 60 ("Kelo opened up a separate avenue for a takings
challenge under which a plaintiff could claim a taking had been effectuated 'under the mere
pretext of a public purpose, when [the] actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit."'
(quoting Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)); see also Richard
A. Epstein, Property Rights, Public Use, and the Perfect Storm: An Essay in Honor of
BernardH. Siegan, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 609, 624 (2008) ("The pretext notion was not the
focal point in much earlier takings litigation, but it looms larger now as the behavior of
public bodies has become more aggressive in the wake of Kelo.").
9. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 54 & n.3. The final clause of the Fifth Amendment reads
"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. This clause is termed the Takings Clause. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S.
498, 539 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). The "public
use" phrase of this clause is sometimes referred to as the Public Use Clause. See Kelo, 545
U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In addition to arguing that the public benefit of the
Atlantic Yards Project was "secondary and incidental to" (and thus a pretext for) conferring
a benefit to Bruce Ratner, the property owners argued the taking also violated their rights
under the Equal Protection Clause and under the Due Process Clause. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at
54 n.3. The court dismissed both of these arguments as well. Id. at 65.
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developer."' 1 Ultimately, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York rejected this claim on the pleadings, using the narrow
plausibility pleading standard announced in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly," in a decision affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. 12 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the summer of
2008.13 For those who believed that pretext claims were the last best hope
in challenging a taking in federal court in the wake of Kelo, 14 the Second
Circuit's decision in Goldstein v. Pataki15 may prove otherwise.
The plaintiffs in Goldstein based their pretext claims on both Justice John
16
Paul Stevens's brief discussion of pretext in the majority opinion of Kelo
and Justice Anthony Kennedy's more lengthy discussion in his
concurrence. 17 Acknowledging that "[t]here may be private transfers in
which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is

so acute that a presumption.., of invalidity is warranted,"'

8

Kennedy's

fifth-vote concurrence identified the possibility of "a more stringent
standard of review than [rational basis review] for a more narrowly drawn
category of takings."' 19
Although the Second Circuit rejected the
application of this heightened pretext standard in Goldstein, it
acknowledged that "Kelo opened up a separate avenue for a takings

10. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 54. Plaintiffs claimed that these benefits included "special
discretionary perks," including capital contributions of $305 million from city and state
governments, exceptions to zoning codes, "a government blank check eliminating the risk of
,extraordinary infrastructure costs,"' various tax exemptions, low-cost financing for the
sports arena, city land conveyed for the low cost of one dollar, and the guarantee to transfer
condemned properties. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *13, Goldstein v. Pataki, 128 S. Ct.
2964 (2008) (No. 07-1247) (denying certiorari), 2008 WL 899311 [hereinafter Goldstein
Cert. Petition].
11. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007); see Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 286-90 (applying the Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly standard).
12. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 52-54. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also
applied the Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly pleading standard in rejecting plaintiffs' pretext
claims. Id. at 56-57.
13. Goldstein, 516 F.3d 50, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2964 (2008).
14. Kelo v. City of New London made clear that states are free to enact stronger
protections for property owners. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. In fact,
many states have enacted such protections since 2005. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Controlling the
GraspingHand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 183,
245-52 (2007).
15. 516 F.3d 50.
16. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005) ("Nor would the City be
allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose
was to bestow a private benefit."); see Goldstein Cert. Petition, supra note 10, at *27 n.13
(discussing the majority's reference to pretext in Kelo).
17. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("A court confronted with a
plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism to private parties should treat the objection
as a serious one and review the record to see if it has merit .... "); see Goldstein Cert.
Petition, supra note 10, at * 18 (discussing Justice Anthony Kennedy's reference to pretext in
Kelo).
18. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
19. Id.
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challenge" where the plaintiff alleges20 the asserted public purpose is a
pretext for bestowing a private benefit.
Nevertheless, the rejection of the pretext claim in Goldstein is important
for several reasons. First, it raises serious questions as to the viability of
any future pretext claims when a narrow plausibility pleading standard is
used. 2 1 How readily these claims should be dismissed is a question that has
already received disparate responses from the Second Circuit (as well as the
Eastern District of New York) in Goldstein and the D.C. Court of Appeals
in Franco v. National Capital Revitalization Corp.22 A second, related
consideration is whether Goldstein's treatment of the pretext claim-as
opposed to a more flexible reading by the Franco court-marks a general
reluctance to apply a "mere pretext" standard.2 3 In light of the conflict
between Goldstein and Franco on both substance and procedure, this Note
examines the factors Justice Kennedy discusses, 24 as well as evidence other
courts have examined in finding pretext,25 in order to determine what
standard of review courts should use in meeting Justice Kennedy's
warning
'26
against the risk of "undetected impermissible favoritism.
The aftermath of Kelo is itself an example of how the interplay of
substance and procedure is critical to pretext claims. Only months after the
Supreme Court's decision, an expos6 revealed that the City of New London
had entered into talks with Pfizer Corporation before implementing the
redevelopment plan. 27 This later revelation by no means demonstrates
20. Goldstein v. Pataki 516 F.3d 50, 60 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).
21. Both the district and circuit courts in Goldstein applied Twombly's plausibility
pleading standard. See infra Part IA. 1 (discussing the importance of the Second Circuit's
application of Twombly's plausibility pleading standard, which is more demanding than
Conley v. Gibson's notice pleading standard). The Twombly standard applies to review of
motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007).
22. 930 A.2d 160, 166 n.6 (D.C. 2007) (declining application of Twombly to pretext
claims). Compare the Franco decision with that in Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 56-57 (applying
Twombly to pretext claims); see also Robert H. Thomas, PleadingKelo Pretext: WhatAbout
Justice

Kennedy?,

INVERSECONDEMNATION.COM,

Feb.

6,

2008,

http://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2008/02/pleading-kelo-p.html
(explaining that while the Second Circuit pays lip service to the notion that, in reviewing a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court is supposed
to take as true the factual allegations and view them in the most favorable light, "the court
held that the complaint did not plead enough facts to show pretext"); infra Part II.A. 1.
23. See infra Part II.A.2.
24. These four factors are (1) the "taking occurred in the context of a comprehensive
development plan"; (2) the projected benefits are not de minimis; (3) "the identities of most
of the private beneficiaries were unknown at the time the city formulated its plans"; and (4)
the city complied with procedural requirements to review its purposes. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493
(Kennedy, J., concurring); see infra Part I.D.2.a.
25. See infra Part I.D.1-2.
26. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
27. See Ted Mann, Pfizer's Fingerprints on Fort Trumbull Plan-Wired in at Birth,
NEW LONDON DAY, Oct. 16, 2005, at Al ("NLDC and city officials have long characterized
their efforts to recast the working-class neighborhood as a response to Pfizer's decision to
build... rather than a move made as a condition of Pfizer's involvement in the project"). In
fact, the article supplies evidence that Pfizer conditioned its agreement to build a facility in
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pretext, nor does this Note argue that Kelo was wrongly decided in light of
these facts. But, disclosure that Pfizer might have conditioned creating a
research facility in New London on the state's promise to redevelop the
neighborhood-an effort which would likely entail the use of eminent
domain-might have made the Court and lower courts more suspicious of
the taking. 28 This expos6 is of no small importance given that the Supreme
Court and even the dissenters in the Connecticut Supreme Court2 9 -who
would have invalidated the takings-concluded that the inquiry30into the
project demonstrated no such dealings between Pfizer and the city.
The result of Kelo is a mixed message about how far courts can or will go
in reviewing pretext claims. 3 1 On the one hand, Kelo's central holding is
deference to legislative judgments about what constitutes a public
purpose. 32 This posture theoretically sends a signal to property owners that
overcoming deference to legislatures is a steep climb, and maybe not
worthwhile. 33 However, on the other hand is Kelo's reference to pretext,
which has emboldened plaintiffs and led to a "growth industry" in pretext
claims. 34 In fact, federal courts are more willing to entertain public use
challenges without first litigating them in state court. 3 5 And therein is the
confusion Kelo has engendered: while the reference to pretext has made
courts more willing to hear challenges to condemnations, courts typically

New London on the city's agreement to revitalize the neighborhood, a process which was
likely to entail eminent domain. See id.; see also JEFF BENEDICT, LITTLE PINK HOUSE: A
TRUE STORY OF DEFIANCE AND COURAGE 235-38 (2009). While presence of such dealings
on the record may not have swayed the Court's decision, that these dealing were not fully
known is potentially suggestive of hidden motives and, thus, of pretext.
28. Mann, supra note 27; see also infra note 275 and accompanying text.
29. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 595 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The record clearly demonstrates that the
development plan was not intended primarily to serve the interests of Pfizer .... ").
30. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 492 (2005) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
31. Amy Brigham Boulris & Annette Lopez, 2007-2008 Update on Judicial Reactions
to Kelo, 2008 A.L.I.-A.B.A LAND USE INST.: PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIG., EMINENT
DOMAIN, AND COMPENSATION 983, 985. These authors note several trends since in the
aftermath of Kelo: "the willingness of federal courts to entertain public use challenges to
state action without first litigating them in state court, the proliferation of litigation and
refinement of the 'pretext' defense left open by Kelo, and the lack of uniformity of rules and
results among the states." Id. They also note that "[a]n emerging trend is the exercise of
more judicial restraint in citing Kelo out of its context." Id. (summarizing cases in 20072008 which respond to Kelo's ruling on public use).
32. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479-83.
33. See BERLINER, supra note 3, at 2-3.
34. Amy Brigham Boulris, Case Law Developments Post-Kelo, 2008 LAND USE INST.:
PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIG., EMINENT DOMAIN, AND COMPENSATION, 961, 963 (citing In
re 49 WB, LLC v. Vill. of Haverstraw, 839 N.Y.S.2d 127, 130 (App. Div. 2007)); see also
Ngai Pindell, Fear and Loathing: Combating Speculation in Local Communities, 39 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 543, 548 (2006) (discussing outrage sparked by the Kelo decision).
35. Brigham Boulris & Lopez, supra note 31, at 985.
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feel constrained by Kelo's message of deference. 36 It is perhaps this
confusion that has led to the disparate treatment of pretext claims in cases
like Franco and Goldstein.
Part I begins with background on Kelo and pretext claims in general.
This analysis culls from pretext case law essential features of a pretext
claim, while also providing an analysis of Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
the case. This part also examines pretext case law to provide an overview
of how courts use a variety of objective factors to infer motive (or purpose),
but do so without relying on subjective statements of legislators. Part II
begins with an analysis of the contrasting decisions in Goldstein and
Franco in order to illuminate the extremes in potential interpretations of
Justice Kennedy's pretext discussion. Next, this part examines a variety of
options with regard to heightened standards of review for pretext claimsstrict scrutiny, means-ends scrutiny, 37 a tripartite burden-shifting
standard, 38 and process scrutiny 39-assuming that Kelo does warrant such
review in some cases.
In Part III, this Note argues that the best method for heightened scrutiny
for pretext claims is process scrutiny. This part describes what this rule
would look like, as applied to pretext claims, arguing that its strength is in
allowing courts to consider factors that may fall outside of a strictlyfollowed process scrutiny test. Ultimately this Note argues that courts
should take an expansive view in examining factors from which they may
infer pretext. Additionally, this Note argues that courts' willingness to hear

36. Brigham Boulris & Lopez, supra note 31, at 985 ("While landowners do not always
prevail in their defenses to condemnation, courts are no longer giving them as short a shrift
as they did before the Kelo controversy captivated the public, press, and legislatures.").
37. There are numerous names for this level of scrutiny. One author refers to it as "midlevel scrutiny," Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword.
Implementing the Constitution, Ill HARV. L. REv. 54, 67 (1997) ("[M]id-level scrutiny...
asks whether a statute is substantially related to an important state interest."), whereas
another terms it intermediate scrutiny, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 671-72 (3d ed. 2006) ("Under intermediate scrutiny a law is

upheld if it is substantially related to an important government purpose." (citing Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 (1983); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976))). For the
purposes of convenience and consistency, this Note uses the term means-ends scrutiny. In
the equal protection context, it is triggered by quasi-suspect classifications like gender. In
the context of a particular type of takings claim, cases involving exactions by the
government, an essential nexus test is applied, which is similar to intermediate or midlevel
scrutiny. But largely, midlevel or means-ends scrutiny functions like a balancing test:
The Court first identifies constitutional values threatened by governmental action;
next it assesses the degree of their implication in a particular case; then the Court
weighs the harm to protected values against the interests that the government has
endeavored to promote. The Court may also consider alternative means by which
the government might achieve its ends at less cost to constitutional values.
Fallon, supra, at 68 (citing an example of such a balancing test in Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), a case dealing with a statute regulating "fusiontickets" in elections under the First Amendment); see infra Part lI.B.
38. See infra Part II.B.3.
39. See infra Part II.C.
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pretext claims should not be frustrated by a view that doing so would
undermine Kelo and its forebears.
I. BACKGROUND ON KELO AND PRETEXT: JUSTICE KENNEDY'S
REFERENCE TO HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY FOR CLAIMS OF "UNDETECTED
IMPERMISSIBLE FAVORITISM"
This part begins with a discussion of Kelo in the context of a series of
public use cases in which the Court upheld the taking based on a standard
of judicial deference to legislative judgments. This part then defines pretext
claims, illustrates the kind of favoritism animating the Court's discussion of
pretext, and explains the relevance between pretext and public purpose.
Next, Part I provides an in-depth analysis of Justice Kennedy's and Justice
Stevens's contrasting discussions of pretext claims, paying special attention
to Justice Kennedy's discussion of claims involving "undetected
impermissible favoritism." Then this part overviews pretext case law
before and after Kelo in order to provide an understanding of how courts
reach a conclusion of pretext. Finally, this part concludes with a discussion
of how courts' deference to legislatures poses a roadblock to mounting a
pretext claim.
A. Backgroundand Relevance of Kelo
Susette Kelo and eight other New London, Connecticut property owners
challenged New London's decision to condemn their homes, under the
theory that the city's asserted purpose of economic development was
invalid under the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 40 The Court
rejected Kelo's Public Use Clause challenge, holding that in governmentauthorized private-to-private transfers of property, challenges to
condemnation will fail so long as the project is rationally related to a valid
public purpose. 4 1 The Court found that the public purpose asserted in
Kelo-economic development 42-was a valid public purpose under the
Fifth Amendment's Public Use Clause, thereby rejecting calls for
heightened scrutiny of such takings. 43 In essence, the Court affirmed the
one party,
proposition that a government may take the private property of
44
and give it to another private party if the other pays more taxes.
The city intended to transfer this land to private developers as part of a
comprehensive redevelopment plan for the city's failed downtown and
waterfront. 4 5 Acting through the not-for-profit New London Development
Corporation (NLDC), New London claimed that it initiated the plan in an
effort to combat an unemployment rate nearly double that of the state, and
40.
41.
42.
43.

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472, 475 (2005).
Id. at 485-90.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 477, 489-90.

44. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-30, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108).
45. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474.
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that the project would create jobs, increase the tax base, and revitalize the
city. 46 Additionally, it sought to "capitalize" on Pfizer's plan to build a
$300 million research facility and the new commerce that the facility would
bring. 47 A crucial issue, although one not litigated in Kelo, was whether the
NLDC was acting at the behest of Pfizer in condemning these properties. 4 8
As the Court understood it, however, the city's goal was to use the Pfizer
49
facility to attract new commerce to the city.
Kelo marked a culmination of a series of Supreme Court cases-first,
Berman v. Parker,50 and later Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midlaf]5 1solidifying the rule that the Court would review deferentially legislative
decisions to take private property. 52 The standard, Justice Kennedy
explained in Kelo, is that "a taking should be upheld as consistent with the
Public Use Clause ...

as long as it is 'rationally related to a conceivable

public purpose.' 53 The Court then noted that Supreme Court jurisprudence
in this area had long shown deference to legislatures in defining the limits
of public use.

54

While the Court sought to situate the decision in this trajectory of
deference to legislatures, the Kelo decision's blockbuster quality stems
from its recognition that economic development itself is a justifiable public
use. 55 In that sense, the decision marks a departure from Berman and
Midkiff in which the taking itself achieved the public purpose-ending
blight and breaking up a land oligarchy, respectively. 56 In Kelo, on the

46. Id. at 472-73.
47. Id. at 473-74.
48. See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text (explaining that the NLDC allowed
Pfizer to dictate the terms of the deal and boundaries of the development, including the
decision to condemn petitioners' property).
49. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473-74.
50. 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (holding that the District of Columbia could condemn a
nonblighted department store in furthering the goals of a redevelopment plan which sought
to end blight because the project should be judged as a whole and not parcel by parcel).
51. 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding that using eminent domain in furtherance of a land
redistribution scheme was rationally related to the legitimate public purpose of ending a land
oligopoly and stabilizing home prices).
52. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488-90.
53. Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241). Rational
basis review is a judicial test "applied under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
to legislation that neither classifies on a 'suspect' basis [e.g., race, class, gender] nor
implicates a 'fundamental' right [e.g., the right to vote]." Fallon, supra note 37, at 69.
54. Kelo, 545 U.S at 480. One author has argued that the rhetoric of Kelo suggests that
the Court "is determined to avoid the excesses of the Lochner era [when the Court used the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate economic and public welfare
regulations] by refusing to substitute its own judgment for that of the democratic branches of
government on the 'public use' question." Charles E. Cohen, The Abstruse Science: Kelo,
Lochner, and RepresentationReinforcement in the Public Use Debate,46 DuQ. L. REv. 375,
379 (2008).
55. See Gideon Kanner, The Public Use Clause: ConstitutionalMandate or 'Hortatory
Fluff?, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 335, 335-38 (2006).
56. Midkiff 467 U.S. at 245; Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36.
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other hand, the taking encompassed private property that was not
blighted, 57 which was not the case in Berman.
What is most significant for pretext claims is that Kelo's requirement of
deference presents a judicial hurdle to challenges that the actual purpose is a
private one. 58 Typically, rational basis review "is so deferential to the
legislative process that a challenged law will be upheld if it could be
rationally interpreted as advancing any conceivable legitimate public
purpose." 59 Courts grant this deference "even if there is nothing other than
judicial speculation to suggest that the government was, in fact, attempting
to advance that purpose in enacting the law." 60 One author argues, that
"[t]he Court thus offered a legal standard so open-ended and deferential that
it left open the question of when, short of clear evidence of corruption, a
taking for economic
development purposes is sufficiently suspect to warrant
61
invalidation."
While noting a deferential approach's potential for abuse, Justice Stevens
invited state legislatures to erect safeguards that the Court felt constrained
from doing itself.62 In this regard, Kelo establishes a floor below which
federal rights of property owners may not be violated, and grants states the
right to create a more protective ceiling. 6 3 Kelo sets a minimum of
protections under the Fifth Amendment against takings of private
property-for example, that a taking may not be for a private purpose-but
allows states to offer more protections, which a number have done since
Kelo. 64 Thus, for those who have criticized Kelo for the potential abuse to
property rights it created, 65 that many states have enhanced protections for

57. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475.
58. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 63 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that the

deference standard affirmed in Kelo constrains courts' review of pretext claims).
59. Cohen, supra note 54, at 408.

60. Id.
61. Mark Fenster, The Takings Clause, Version 2005:
The Legal Process of
ConstitutionalProperty Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 667, 738 (2007) (citing Kelo, 545 U.S.

at 488-89).
62. Cohen, supra note 54, at 410 ("[H]e was inviting the political process to enforce the

public use clause more fully than the Court has been able to.").
63. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 ("[N]othing in our opinion precludes any State from placing

further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many States already impose
'public use' requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline."); see also Lynn E. Blais,
Urban Revitalization in the Post-Kelo Era, 34 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 657, 671-76 (2007)
(discussing state legislative responses to Kelo). Columnist George Will noted that Kelo's

holding, which leaves it to the states to enhance protections of private property, is consistent
with the Court's doctrine of judicial restraint; however, conservatives who preach this
approach, as well as call for the need to limit government, witnessed an ideological turning
of the tables. George F. Will, Damaging 'Deference,'WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at A31.
64. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 14, at 245-52 (discussing post-Kelo state-enacted

protections in Alabama, Delaware, Ohio, and Texas). Additionally, at least eleven state
supreme courts have banned takings for economic development, including Arkansas,
Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
and Washington. Id. at 187 n. 17; see, e.g., County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765

(Mich. 2004).
65. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
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property owners-some even forbidding by statute pretextual takings-may
allay those fears.
Yet in the absence of such protections, concerns about the reach of Kelo
remain. In her Kelo dissent, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor criticized the
majority decision as an "abdication" of the Court's responsibility, arguing
that while states "play many important functions in our system of dual
sovereignty," compensating for the Court's "refusal to enforce properly the
Federal Constitution.. . is not among them."66 If the Public Use Clause 67
is
to have any meaning, she exhorted, the judiciary needs to act as a check.
The product of this deference, argued Justice O'Connor, is that "the
government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer
resources to those with more." 6 8 Put simply, "[n]othing is to prevent the
State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a
69
shopping mall, or any farm with a factory."
Kelo's approval of economic development as a justification for taking
property has either opened the door to substantial pretextual abuse or, at
least, to fear of such abuse. 70 In his dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas noted
that takings for economic development will likely have a disproportionate
effect on urban minorities, writing that the rule is reminiscent of the "negro
removal" of the 1950s. 7 1 Justice Thomas found this risk so pronounced that
he wrote in Kelo that takings for economic development are a prime case
for invoking the protections to "discrete and insular minorities" announced
in the famed United States v. Carolene Products Co. 7 2 footnote number
four, a text that the Court has used to authorize strict scrutiny review of
73
legislation.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Kelo, 545 U.S at 504 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id, at 497 (citing Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930)).
Id. at 505.
Id. at 503 (citing 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F.

Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Bugryn v. Bristol, 774 A.2d 1042 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001);
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by

County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004)).
70. See BERLINER, supra note 3, at 4 (arguing that the rapid increase in use of eminent
domain confirms fears that this power is used to displace the poor).
71. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 521-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For a history of the destructive
consequences of slum clearance programs in 1950s New York City, see ROBERT A. CARO,
THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 961-83 (1974); see also
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 831
(3d ed. 2005) (discussing the effects of slum clearance in Washington D.C. in the aftermath
of Berman v. Parker).
72. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
73. Kelo, 545 U.S at 521-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. at 152 n.4). While United States v. Carolene Products Co., decided during the

New Deal era, marked the Court's willingness to defer to Congress on economic regulation,
footnote number four of that opinion has been interpreted by the Court to authorize judicial
intervention in order to protect minorities who either lack adequate political representation or
are targets of prejudice and discrimination. DAVID ANDREW SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E.
SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA, 43-44 (1996). The Court

has interpreted footnote number four as a basis for "special scrutiny" of regulations that
affect individuals closed off from the political process and those whom the regulation places
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For some, the explosion in condemnations since Kelo has confirmed this
fear of abuse. In the year after Kelo was decided, the Institute for Justice
found that 5783 properties have been threatened or condemned for private
commercial development, roughly equal to the number of such
condemnations in the five years preceding Kelo. 74 The Institute for Justice
notes that the power of eminent domain is not used as a last resort, despite
local officials claiming otherwise, but is now being used on projects which
are developing on their own without the need for government involvement
through the condemnation process. 75 This, the Institute for Justice argues,
means that local governments are favoring one private party at the expense
76
of another.
Additionally, scholars have observed that eminent domain is capable of
severe exploitation at the local governing level. Generally, private
involvement in the exercise of eminent domain increases the risk of
corruption, 77 secondary rent seeking, 78 and the threat of relocation. 79 The
risk of favoritism may be especially acute on the local level given that
"special financial interests may more often dominate smaller units of
government, whose continued health and presence in the community are
critical to the community and to its tax base." 80 Permissive review of the
use of eminent domain means that special interests may buy the power

in a suspect classification. See id. at 44; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 695-96
(discussing Carolene Products as a basis for courts applying strict scrutiny).
74. BERLINER, supra note 3, at 2. Of the 5783 figure, local governments actually filed
for condemnations only 354 times, in contrast to the 3722 filed in the five years preceding
Kelo. Id. at 2-3. The Institute for Justice explains the decrease in actual condemnations
post-Kelo as a product of property owners' view that Kelo made resistance to selling their
property futile. See id. Thus, although after Kelo property owners voluntarily give up their
property more frequently than before the decision, this is due to the "threat" of
condemnation-for example, statements by public officials that eminent domain might be
used. The Institute for Justice finds that such threats are as effective at taking the private
property, if not more so, than actually condemning it. Id.
75. Id. at 5.
76. Id.
77. Daniel B. Kelly, Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local Governments,
and Impermissible Favoritism, 17 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming Summer 2009)
(manuscript at 4), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-l 132429.
78. Id. at 5 (citing Henry A. Span, Public Choice Theory and the PoliticalUtility of the
Takings Clause, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 11, 50 (2003)) (describing secondary rent seeking as a
process whereby private parties compete to capture the eminent domain power, causing
social waste); see also, ELLICKSON & BEEN, supranote 71, at 838 (citing Thomas W. Merrill,
The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 86 (1986)) (explaining rent seeking
as competitive lobbying for government favors).
79. Kelly, supra note 77, at 5 ("[P]rivate parties... threaten to relocate unless the local
government condemns land on their behalf."); see, e.g., 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster
Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("In short, the very
reason that [the City of] Lancaster decided to condemn 99 Cents' leasehold interest was to
appease Costco.").
80. Bernard W. Bell, Legislatively Revising Kelo v. City of New London: Eminent
Domain, Federalism,and CongressionalPowers, 32 J. LEGIS. 165, 189 (2006).
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without fear of judicial intervention. 8 1 Some argue that because Kelo
provides cities and developers with a constitutionally protected rationale for
taking private property, it incentivizes them to exert influence on elected or
'8 3
appointed officials 82 and to "engage in rent seeking to secure the benefit.
In fact, the very reason there are more pretext claims being litigated since
Kelo may be due in part to the fact that "public bodies [have] become more
' '84
aggressive in the wake of Kelo.
Against this backdrop of the Court's commitment to deference to
legislatures and concern over abuse of eminent domain is the pretext debate.
This debate asks whether Kelo carved a more robust judicial role for
reviewing claims of favoritism, 85 or whether such scrutiny would contradict
86
the Court's central holding in Kelo.

81. See Donald J. Kochan, "Public Use" and the IndependentJudiciary: Condemnation
in an Interest-GroupPerspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 52 (1998) ("Legislators can sell
the eminent domain power to special interests for almost any use, promising durability in the
deal given the low probability that the judiciary will invalidate it on the grounds that the
condemnation is private in nature.").
82. See Kanner, supra note 55, at 365 ("Kelo's promise, in effect, is that any property
may be forcibly taken for any purpose deemed by redevelopers to be more lucrative than the
existing one."). That cities and towns may be willing to acquiesce to eminent domain
requests is an indication of the unique advantage insiders have in wielding power over the
property of others. Epstein, supra note 8, at 624 ("The instantaneous approval of the
condemnation that [the private developer charged the redevelopment plan] received from the
Village only confirms the advantage that the insiders have in these projects.") (discussing
Didden v. Vill. of Port Chester, 173 F. App'x 931, 932 (2d Cir. 2006), cert denied, 127 S. Ct.
1127 (2007)); see also Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use" Requirement in Eminent Domain
Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchasesand PrivateInfluence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
34 (2006) (citing Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 977 (2003)) ("Indeed, because private parties can use eminent
domain to obtain a relatively concentrated benefit, these parties have an incentive to use
inordinate influence to achieve their private objectives through condemnations."); Kochan,
supra note 81, at 80-81.
83. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public Use, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 465 (2007)
("[T]he government's ability to bypass the market... makes eminent domain an attractive
'incentive' to offer to private companies. The potential beneficiaries have a substantial
incentive to engage in rent seeking to secure the benefit of this bypass (not to mention to
capture all or part of the 'condemnation bonus'...
84. Epstein, supra note 8, at 624.
85. See Franco v. Nat'l Capital Revitalization Corp. 930 A.2d 160, 168 (D.C. 2007)
(rejecting as too broad the lower court's conclusion that "once the legislature has declared
that there is a public purpose for a condemnation, an owner is foreclosed as a matter of law
from demonstrating that the stated reason is a pretext"). The Franco v. National Capital
Revitalization Corp. court further explains that "Kelo recognized that there may be situations
where a court should not take at face value what the legislature has said." Id. at 169.
86. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 62 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting the notion that
Kelo overruled "over a century of precedent and [sought] to require federal courts in all
cases to give close scrutiny to the mechanics of a taking rationally related to a classic public
use as a means to gauge the purity of the motives of the various government officials who
approved it").
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B. Pretext Claims: Kelo, Favoritism,and PrivatePurpose
It is a fundamental and accepted principle of the Fifth Amendment that a
taking that is purely private in nature is unconstitutional. 87 The Court has
stated that "[a] purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the
public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government
and would thus be void."' 88 This principle prohibiting private takings is at
89
the heart of pretext claims.
90
Pretext claims stem from this prohibition against purely private takings.
In essence, a court concluding that a taking is either pretextual or purely
private-purely private meaning there is no valid asserted purpose 9 1-finds
a common central fact: the actual or primary purpose for the taking is
nonpublic. 92 The difference lies between whether a court construes the
asserted purpose as having no public benefit and thus being solely for a
private purpose, 93 or whether the court finds there is a valid asserted
purpose but the actual, underlying purpose is a private one. 94 Thus, courts
like the district court in Goldstein interpret Kelo as advancing two ways of
demonstrating that the taking was for a private purpose: either "the 'sole
purpose' of the taking is to transfer property to a private party," 95 or "the
asserted purpose of the taking is a 'mere pretext' for an actual purpose to
'96
bestow a private benefit.
The concept of a pretext claim is that private purpose may go hand-inhand with favoritism, and that favoritism, in turn, is masked by a pretextual

87. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) ("A purely private taking
could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate
purpose of government and would thus be void."); see also Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469, 478 n.5 (2005) ("'[A] law that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is
against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and,
therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it."' (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 388 (1798))).
88. Midkiff 467 U.S. at 245; see also Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S.
55, 80 (1937) ("[Olne person's property may not be taken for the benefit of another private
person without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation be paid.").
89. See 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d
1123, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245).
90. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
91. See, e.g., Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 106, 111 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1998) (holding that a project proposed by Donald Trump which sought to take
private property to make way for a parking lot and rehabilitated hotel primarily served
private, and not public, interests).
92. See Goldstein Cert. Petition, supra note 10, at *20.
93. See Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 286-87.
94. See Goldstein Cert. Petition, supra note 10, at *20.
95. Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 286 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469, 477 (2005); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).
96. Id. at 286 (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478). In Goldstein v. Pataki, for example, the
district court conducted these two analyses separately but concluded in both that the
plaintiffs did not allege facts sufficient for a juror to find that the sole purpose was to bestow
a private benefit to a private developer. Id. at 287. Nor did the plaintiff plead facts sufficient
to support the claim that the asserted purpose was a mere pretext for benefiting a private
developer. Id. at 290.
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justification. 97 For example, if a government plans to condemn private
property for the asserted purpose of creating a public parking garage, but its
real purpose is to use that site to help Macy's secure a new location, the
asserted purpose would be pretextual and the motive favoritism. 9 8 On the
other hand, if a court discerns there is no potential benefit to the public, and
that the taking merely allows a private party to reap a windfall, the taking is
purely private. 99 In such a case the condemning authority would not claim
that it lacks a secret purpose, but could claim, as New London did in Kelo,
that the court should interpret its asserted purpose of economic
100
development as a public one.
A condemning authority's reasons for favoring a certain party may have
various explanations: corruption,' 0 l a complex web of social and business
relations marked by an exchange of benefits and favors over an extended
period of time,10 2 or what one court has called the "'thickness' of the social
and institutional connections." 10 3 Yet, whatever the source of favoritism,
courts prohibit it out of concerns for basic fairness. The principle behind
prohibiting favoritism is similar to the principle that prohibits
discrimination 0 4 ; while courts prohibit discrimination because it violates
basic fairness in that some individuals are singled out to bear heavier
burdens than the rest of society, the corollary to this principle is that
"fairness concerns should bar the government from allowing some people
'in all fairness and justice' should be enjoyed
alone to enjoy benefits that10 in
5
by the public as a whole."

97. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that pretextual
takings intended to confer benefits to private parties are "forbidden" by the Public Use
Clause); see also Regan, supra note 7 (discussing pretext in McCulloch v. Maryland).
98. This hypothetical convergence of pretext and favoritism is taken from an actual
effort by the legendary "master builder" Robert Moses. CARO, supra note 71, at 741-42.
Moses's real-life attempt to take private property for the asserted purpose of building a
parking garage was thwarted when the New York City Traffic Commissioner learned that his
real motivation was to secure for Jack Straus-owner of Macy's and a Moses ally-an
uptown branch, and threatened to go to the press. Id.
99. See, e.g., Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 106, 111 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998).
100. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
101. See Kelly, supra note 77, at 4.
102. See, e.g., CARO supra note 71, at 740-41 (discussing how in exchange for Moses's
favors conferred on the Archdiocese of New York, most notably in the creation of Fordham
University's Lincoln Center campus, Moses did not exact a one-for-one quid pro quo, but
would instead call on the Archdiocese to assist him in giving local politicians a "push" when,
from time to time, a project he was sponsoring stalled).
103. See In re Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d 917, 936 (Del, Ch. 2003); see also infra note 237
and accompanying text.
104. Indeed, Black's Law Dictionary implies that favoritism and discrimination are
synonymous. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 641 (8th ed. 2004) ("Preference or selection, usu.
invidious, based on factors other than merit. See NEPOTISM; PATRONAGE. Cf.
DISCRIMINATION.") (defining favoritism).
105. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 578 (2001)
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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As Kelo makes abundantly clear, that a taking yields private benefits
neither invalidates the taking nor proves pretext or favoritism. 106 But what
makes a pretextual taking invalid is that the government's actual purpose is
illicit, even if the taking would achieve a permissible, perhaps even
desirable outcome.10 7 In Aaron v. Target Corp.,10 8 the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri granted an injunction on the
condemnation of private property after it discovered the genuine reason for
the taking.' 0 9 There, even though the government asserted that the purpose
was to end blight' 0 -which under Berman is a legitimate purpose-it may
not use its power of eminent domain "in the manner of a 'default broker of
land.,",ll The improper purpose thus taints what might otherwise be a
valid endeavor-what Professors Robert Ellickson and Vicki Been term
"[w]hen a 'giving' taints a taking." 112 In some cases, that the asserted
purpose is a mere pretext may call into question whether the condemnation
is capable of achieving or will be used to achieve a valid purpose.11 3 These
claims boil down to arguing that the government takes A's property because
14
it wants to benefit B, though it says its purpose is to benefit the public.'

106. Id. at 485 ("Quite simply, the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often
benefit individual private parties.").
107. See Aaron v. Target Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 2003). Some
courts hold that to satisfy the "mere pretext" test for private use, plaintiffs "must do more
than 'alleg[e] that the purported purposes of the Project are dubious,' but instead must
'allege that the actual purpose of the Project is to bestow a private benefit."' CBS Outdoor,
Inc. v. N.J. Transit Corp., No. 06-2428, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64155, at *49 (D.N.J. Aug.
30, 2007) (quoting Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)).
108. 269 F.Supp. 2d 1162.
109. Id. at 1177 ("'Courts must look beyond the government's purported public use to
determine whether that is the genuine reason or if it is merely pretext."' (quoting
Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1229
(C.D. Cal. 2002))).
110. Id. at 1166-69.
111. Id. at 1177 (quoting Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1,
10 (Ill. 2002)).
112. ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 71, at 837; see also Gordon G. Young, Justifying
Motive Analysis in JudicialReview, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 191, 193 (2008) (arguing
that in the late 1970s, "it had become apparent that illegitimate racial motives powerfully
taint the actions that they cause" (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977))). Professor Gordon Young discusses Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. in connection with Kelo's reference to
pretext, arguing that both cases call for examining legislative motives. Id. at 193, 230-231.
In explaining that inquiry into government's purpose as grounds of discerning the
constitutionality of its acts fits within people's ethical structures, Professor Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., writes that "there is nothing mysterious about the idea that the quality and
permissibility of governmental acts, and hence their constitutionality, should sometimes
depend on their purposes" as opposed to their effects. Fallon, supra note 37, at 98.
113. Professor Gideon Kanner draws on an example from 1960s Los Angeles where a
private home was taken to make way for the privately owned Motion Picture Museum, but
where the property was later never developed for that use. Gideon Kanner, We Don 't Have
to Follow Any Stinkin' Planning-Sorry About That, Justice Stevens, 39 URB. LAW. 529,
546-48 (2007).
114. Issues regarding the propriety of courts examining the desire, intention, motivation,
or purpose of government actions are discussed later in Part I.D.
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The rule with respect to favoritism in a case like Aaron is thus a bright line:
if a court finds the underlying purpose is favoritism, the taking will be
invalidated.' 15
C. Pretext in Justice Stevens's Opinion and JusticeKennedy's
Concurrence: What Is and Isn't Pretext and the Post-Kelo Debate
The risk of favoritism and the constitutional prohibition on private
takings underpin the Court's discussion of pretext in Kelo. A comparison
of Justice Stevens's and Justice Kennedy's discussions of takings motivated
by favoritism elucidates the Court's thinking about the kinds of tools
available to courts for evaluating pretextual takings. The comparison also
reveals how far each Justice went in his discussion of a potential rule for
pretext claims.
1. Justices Stevens and Kennedy: No Pretext in Kelo, but the Aftermath
May Demonstrate Otherwise
To be clear, the Kelo Court found that the taking at issue was not
motivated by favoritism. 116 Furthermore, neither Justice clearly explicated
a test for raising pretext claims in the future, nor had the Court ever
developed a rule for distinguishing a permissible taking and a "purelyprivate taking."" 17 While Justice Stevens writes that a one-to-one transfer
of property "would certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was
afoot, the hypothetical cases posited by petitioners can be confronted if and
when they arise."' I18 Justice Kennedy also resisted such hypotheticals.119
In concluding that it was improbable that Susette Kelo's property was
condemned for the purpose of benefiting another private party, Justice
Stevens looked to two factors: the presence of a comprehensive plan and
the fact that the city had not identified the party to benefit from the taking
prior to the redevelopment plan. 120 First, since the private parties to benefit
from the taking were not known before creating the redevelopment plan, the
Kelo majority found that it did not make sense that the condemning
authority could act out of a motivation to benefit a particular party when
they did not even know who that party would be. 12 1 Additionally, claiming
that New London's asserted purpose of redevelopment was a mere pretext

115. Cohen, supra note 54, at 417.
116. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 n.6 (2005).
117. Cohen, supra note 54, at 385 ("Prior to Kelo, the Court had never attempted to set
forth a rule for distinguishing a permissible taking and a purely-private taking." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
118. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487.
119. Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("This is not the occasion for conjecture as to
what sort of cases might justify a more demanding standard ....
120. Id. at 478 (majority opinion).
121. Id. at 478 n.6 ("[T]he identities of those private parties were not known when the
plan was adopted. It is, of course, difficult to accuse the government of having taken A's
property to benefit the private interests of B when the identity of B was unknown.").
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for conferring benefit to Pfizer would have also been difficult to prove
properties, and the
because Pfizer was not the developer of the condemned
1 22
taking.
to
prior
unknown
was
developer
ultimate
Second, Justice Stevens's opinion-and Justice Kennedy's concurrence
as well-suggest that the presence of a comprehensive plan itself "almost
always precludes a finding of pretext."' 123 Although one author explains
that the Court finds planning and pretext "incompatible,"' 124 planning and
125
pretext is less a relationship of contradiction, than one of probability. 126
planning,
The thinking is that through "'carefully considered'
information about the project is divulged to the public, enhancing public
to "hesitate
scrutiny and causing local officials and private developers
127
before proposing projects that are not in the public interest."'
Like Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy found it significant that there was
a comprehensive plan and that the identity of the beneficiary was not
known at the time New London's plans were made. 12 8 In addition, Justice
1 29
Kennedy identifies two other factors that foreclosed finding pretext:
first, that "the projected economic benefits of the project cannot be
characterized as de minimis"; and, second, that "[t]he city complied with
elaborate procedural requirements that facilitate review of the record and
inquiry into the city's purposes." 130 Despite resisting outright explication
of a rule, enumerating factors that do not make Kelo a pretextual taking
allows courts a basis for inferring what might make such a taking. Some
courts downplay its significance, 131 but others predict that, while not the
holding in Kelo, Justice Kennedy's concurrence "may accurately predict
what the Court will hold when the record before it does not resolve the
122. See Kelly, supra note 77, at 42. A pretext claim in Kelo would be more convoluted
than in a case like Goldstein. In Goldstein the alleged primary beneficiary of the taking was
the party who actually took title to the property. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 54 (2d
Cir. 2008). In Kelo, it would have been difficult to argue this because Pfizer would not
benefit directly by taking the property from A and giving it to B, because Pfizer was not the
proposed owner and developer of the takings area. Had the Kelo plaintiffs claimed that the
primary purpose was to benefit Pfizer, the theory would have to have been that the primary
purpose was to entice Pfizer to settle in New London, which the city could only do by taking
property for a developer who would, in turn, serve Pfizer's demand for building residences
for potential employees.
123. Garnett, supra note 83, at 454.
124. Id.
125. While the Court does not explicate this logic, some scholars suggest that
comprehensive plans reduce the risk of favoritism, because planning "act[s] as a filtering
mechanism." Kelly, supra note 77, at 14.
126. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 536
(Conn. 2004)).
127. Kelly, supra note 77, at 14.
128. Compare Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 n.6, with id. at 492 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
130. Id.
131. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 62 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[W]e must reject the notion
that, in a single sentence, the Kelo majority sought sub silentio to overrule Berman, Midkiff,
and over a century of precedent and to require federal courts in all cases to give close
scrutiny to the mechanics of a taking ....).
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pretext issue." 132 The Court itself has embraced this logic, finding that a
fifth vote concurrence on a fragmented court may be determinative of future
cases. 133 Most basically, Justice Kennedy's concurrence has been applied
34
in mounting a defense to condemnation.1
However, the core assumption that the taking in Kelo was not pretextual
is challenged by a post-Kelo expos6 and history of the case. 135 According
to a recent history of the events leading up to Kelo, the Court actually did
get the sequence of events mostly correct: the NLDC identified the area as
ripe for redevelopment and then Pfizer announced its plans to build a
research facility in the area. 136 However, what this simple rendition of the
facts misses is that the NLDC enticed Pfizer to join the project by letting
Pfizer dictate the contours of the plan, including the decision to condemn
the properties in Kelo's neighborhood. 137 Thus, while the NLDC may
have, in the Court's words, "intended the development plan to capitalize on
the arrival of the Pfizer facility and the new commerce it was expected to
attract,"1 38 facts revealed after Kelo indicate that the decision to use
eminent domain may have been an effort to appease Pfizer. Indeed, the
city's desire to install Pfizer was so strong that it blocked an effort to
impose a competitive bidding process for the site in order to "ensure the
land got developed in a manner that complemented the Pfizer
39
development."'
A letter from the NLDC president months before Pfizer announced its
plans detailed the NLDC's effort to meet Pfizer's "requirements.' 40 In
addition to the mill site, which the city was to convey to Pfizer for the
research facility, the biggest such demand Pfizer made was for the NLDC to
assemble two adjacent properties that aligned with Pfizer's vision for the
area. 14 1 One of these sites was the takings area, where the NLDC would
"buy up all these properties, clearing the way for redevelopment in line with
Pfizer's wishes."' 142 One Pfizer official, who was incidentally the NLDC

132. Franco v. Nat'l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 169 n.8 (D.C. 2007).
133. Id. at 169 n.8 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, (1977)). The
Marks v. United States Court held that "[w~hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds." (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15
(1976) (Stewart, J.)).
134. See Franco, 930 A.2d at 169-75; MH-C Fin. Ltd. P'ship v. City of San Rafael, No. C
00-3785 VRW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89195, *42-45 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2006) (citing
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in noting that pretext claims must be taken seriously and
given careful and extensive inquiry).
135. See BENEDICT, supra note 27, at 235-38; Mann, supra note 27.
136. BENEDICT, supra note 27, at 17-18, 24, 60-61.
137. Id. at 235-36.
138. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 464, 474 (2005).
139. BENEDICT, supra note 27, at 70-71.

140. Id. at 236.
141. Id. at 49-50.
142. Id. at 50.
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in simpler terms:
president's husband, stated the reason for the taking
143
tenements.
by
surrounded
be
to
want
not
did
Pfizer
In their brief to the Court, the Kelo petitioners did make mention of
Pfizer's "requirements," writing that New London "clearly intended to
benefit Pfizer," but the discussion of Pfizer's role was not a pretext
argument. Rather, petitioners explained that the motivation for benefiting
Pfizer was for the city "to reap the supposed trickle-down" benefits Pfizer's
development would bring. 144 Focusing on the validity of economic
development as a public purpose, Kelo petitioners conceded that New
London's desire to benefit Pfizer was a means to their primary and public
purpose. Yet they also argued that such trickle-down benefits demonstrate
that economic development lacks a "limiting principle."' 145 Had the case
been litigated as a pretext claim, perhaps the Kelo46petitioners would have
made more of Pfizer's "10,000 pound gorilla" role.1
This next section distinguishes the hypothetical pretext cases mentioned
in Kelo from other standards the Court could apply to invalidate an
improper taking.
2. Three Ways of Striking Improper Takings: Rational Basis Review,
Equal Protection Clause, and Undetected Impermissible Favoritism
Taken together, both Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens suggested
three bases for striking impermissible takings: (1) rational basis review
under the Public Use Clause; 14 7 (2) the Equal Protection Clause;' 4 8 and (3)
perhaps, a new rule where property owners raise a "suspicion that a private
purpose was afoot"---essentially, a pretext claim. 149 Like Justice Kennedy,
Justice Stevens addressed fears of takings for a private purpose, and in
doing so outlined methods for scrutinizing takings. First, in reserving the
power to confront "hypothetical cases ... if and when they arise," Justice
Stevens drew on the Court's general power to strike takings when eminent
domain power goes too far. 150 This reference implies a constitutional
source of authority for a future pretext standard. Second, Justice Stevens
noted that there are other constitutional mechanisms at the Court's disposal
143. Id. at 230.
144. Brief of Petitioners at 14, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2004) (No.
04-108).
145. Id.
146. Id.

147. Compare Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487 & n.17 (discussing invalidating a statute "for lack of
concurring) (explaining that rational
a reasoned explanation"), with id. at 491 (Kennedy, J.,
basis review is capable of striking down a taking that "is intended to favor a particular
private party").
148. Compare id. at 487 & n.17 (citing Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562
(2000) (per curiam) (holding that taking violated the Equal Protection Clause where it
discriminated against a "class of one")), with id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 487 n. 17; accordid. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 487 n.18 ("'The power to tax is not the power to destroy ....' (quoting
Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting))).
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than just the Public Use Clause to strike down an impermissible taking,
152
including rational basis review1 5 1 and the Equal Protection Clause.
Justice Kennedy explicates how rational basis review under the Public
Use Clause is capable of striking takings motivated by favoritism:
A court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause
should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a
particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits,
just as a court applying rational-basis review under the Equal Protection
Clause must strike down a government classification that is clearly
intended to injure a particular class of private parties, with only incidental
or pretextual public justifications.153
In analogizing to the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Kennedy arguably
was not suggesting that impermissible favoritism claims be brought under
the Equal Protection Clause, but that Equal Protection Clause analysis in
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 154 and U.S. Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno155 are illustrations of the potential bite that rational
basis review has in voiding a condemnation.1 56 Practically, when a court
applies rational basis review, the government action will be upheld so long
as it is "rationally related to a legitimate state interest"1 57-even the
"flimsiest" of reasons will survive scrutiny. 15 8 However, a case like
Cleburne demonstrates that deference to the legislative branch-which Kelo
prescribes for public use challenges-does not grant carte blanche to
151. See id. at n.1 7 (explaining that takings may be invalidated for "lack of a reasoned
explanation").
152. Here, Justice Stevens noted that in cases "rais[ing] a suspicion that a private purpose
was afoot" courts may respond to such "aberrations with a skeptical eye" by applying the
Equal Protection Clause. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487 & n.17 (citing Olech, 528 U.S. at 562).
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech announced the rule that the Equal Protection Clause applies
to discrimination against a "class of one." See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 676.
153. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing City of Cleburne v. Clebume
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47, 450 (1985) (striking down a zoning regulation as
irrational)); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-36 (1973) (invalidating a
statute that limited public benefits where the statute was motivated by a desire to
discriminate against hippies, evincing a bare desire to harm). Claims brought under the
Equal Protection Clause where the statute does not implicate a suspect or quasi-suspect class
are analyzed under rational basis review. See CHEMERIKNSKY, supra note 37, at 677-78, 68788.
154. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
155. 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) ("[A] bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.").
156. See Bell, supra note 80, at 170 ("[Kennedy] cited [Cleburneand Moreno], two equal
protection cases, as examples of cases in which the Supreme Court had found that a
governmental action failed 'rational basis' review precisely because the challenged action
was primarily intended to disadvantage certain private parties." (internal citations omitted)).
157. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). The Equal Protection
Clause analysis would substitute "legitimate state interest" for public use, but for the
purposes of this analysis, there is no substantive difference. This language in City of New
Orleans v. Dukes is nearly identical to Justice Stevens's reference in Kelo that a taking is
upheld "'[w]hen the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational."'
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1984)).
158. Young, supra note 112, at 201.
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legislatures. In Cleburne, a local ordinance failed rational basis review
under the Equal Protection Clause where the Court found that a zoning
ordinance that distinguished between a home for the mentally disabled and
other facilities was irrational. 159 Applied to the takings context, rational
basis review is ostensibly capable of striking down at least two kinds of
condemnations: either if the asserted purpose is not a cognizable public
purpose (and thus is irrational) under the Public Use Clause 160 or because a
clear intention to benefit a private party is itself an irrational or invalid
purpose under the Public Use Clause.' 6 1 The type of "undetected"
favoritism to which Justice Kennedy referred would not be scrutinized
under such review, because either the asserted purpose is likely to be
rational or the underlying purpose would not be marked by a "clear
intention" of favoritism.
Justice Stevens cited to a different Equal Protection Clause case, Village
of Willowbrook v. Olech,162 perhaps to suggest that the Equal Protection
Clause may also serve as a separate, independent basis for challenging
impermissible takings. 16 3 For example, in cases where the taking is done
out of "spite" the Equal Protection Clause may be a proper tool. 164 There

159. 473 U.S. at 450.
160. Lack of a logical basis for the asserted purpose was part of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit's rationale for invalidating the taking in 99 Cents Only Stores v.
Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (rejecting
prevention of "future blight" as speculative and without support under state eminent domain
law). However, this court also struck the taking on grounds of pretext. Id. at 1129.
Presumably, Justice Stevens interpreted the taking in 99 Cents as simply lacking a rational
basis, as he left for a separate footnote discussion of a new rule that would address
hypothetical cases that raise a suspicion that a private purpose is afoot. Compare supra note
150 and accompanying text, with supra note 151 and accompanying text.
161. The hidden purpose of a desire to benefit a private party is a logical corollary of
equal protection cases like U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno where the hidden
purpose is a "bare ... desire to harm." 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). See supra note 153.
162. 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).
163. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487 & n.17 (citing Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562
(2000) (per curiam)).
164. Although the Olech Court did not find the taking to be motivated by spite, Professor
Debra Pogrund Stark believes this decision serves as a basis for a future court to invalidate a
taking where the motive is one of ill will toward the property owner, and that such a taking
would be pretextual. See Debra Pogrund Stark, How Do You Solve a Problem Like in Kelo?,
40 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 609, 615-17 (2007) (discussing Kelo's reference to the applicability
of Olech). Applied to a hypothetical situation involving the condemnation of Justice David
Souter's farmhouse in Weare, New Hampshire, Stark finds that "if the purpose of the taking
is to harm Justice Souter and [is] motivated by ill will towards him" then it could be
enjoined. Id. at 617. The reasoning behind such a conclusion is that "when a property owner
is treated differently from other property owners... based on ill will rather than a rational
basis, such action violates the Equal Protection Clause and will be struck down." Id. This
hypothetical is actually based on a real chain of events whereby the town of Weare sought to
condemn Justice Souter's property in response to his vote with the majority in Kelo. See
Peter J. Smith, Understanding Kelo: Why Justice Souter Should Be Praised,N.H. UNION
LEADER, Aug. 3, 2005, at A9 (explaining that the criticism of Kelo has become so personal
that opponents of the decision joined in a campaign to seize Justice Souter's farmhouse to
build a luxury hotel in honor of the U.S. Constitution).
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may also be cases like Armendariz v. Penman, 165 where the government
action may fail under both the Public Use Clause (because the effort masks
a private purpose) and the Equal Protection Clause (because it is
66
discriminatory). 1
However, Kennedy was perhaps not satisfied that rational basis review or
Equal Protection Clause analysis are capable of invalidating all pretextual
takings. 167 Justice Stevens also indicated that he would invalidate a taking
where the asserted purpose was pretextual. 168 In discussing the new
category of pretext claims, Justice Kennedy explicitly left open the
possibility that a court may presume some takings do not deserve
deferential review: "There may be private transfers in which the risk of
undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a
presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the
Public Use Clause."' 169 The remainder of this Note examines more closely
the standard of review for claims of undetected impermissible favoritism
and what factors, perhaps other than those Justice Stevens and Justice
Kennedy discuss in Kelo, might trigger such scrutiny.
Justice Kennedy based his discussion of heightened scrutiny on the
notion that some categories of takings are prone to risks that make them
deserving of suspicion. 170 He cited to Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel' 7 1 for
the proposition that some kinds of regulations are inherently suspicious and
thus deserve heightened scrutiny. 172 In Apfel, the Court struck down a
retroactive act of Congress that forced a former coal company to pay
additional medical benefits after it had left the coal industry. 173 To Justice
165. 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996).
166. Id. at 1321, 1326, 1328 (holding that property owners stated a cause of action when
they claimed the city "faked violations" of the housing code in order to initiate a chain of
events that led to condemnation of their homes). The Ninth Circuit did not reach a decision
on the merits, but held that the claim was enough to survive summary judgment. Id. at 1328.
167. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting the possibility of "a more stringent standard of review than that announced in
Berman and Midkiff').
168. See Stark, supra note 164, at 614-15. Stark explains that Justice John Paul
Stevens's reference to City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930), a case in which the
lower courts found a pretextual motive, is a basis to conclude that Stevens would have
invalidated a taking that "failed to provide evidence of a valid purpose, and where the
evidence to the contrary indicated a purpose that [was] private in nature." Stark, supra note
164, at 615.
169. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S.
498, 549-50 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part))
(analogizing to a case where the Court applied heightened scrutiny to retroactive legislation
under the Due Process Clause).
170. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
171. 524 U.S. 498.
172. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at
549-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)).
173. Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and
dissenting in part) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994)). In his
concurrence of that judgment, Justice Kennedy noted that retroactive lawmaking may
amount to a "'means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals"' and thus the
very act itself is deserving of suspicion. Id.
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Kennedy, some takings for economic development presented a similar risk
of impermissibility. On one hand, Justice Kennedy noted that just because
the purpose is economic development does not necessitate heightened
scrutiny. 174 On the other hand, in the next paragraph, Justice Kennedy
references factors that may establish pretext, implying that the suspicion of
undetected impermissible favoritism is raised by the presence of those
factors. 175 He noted that these factors form a body of "cases in which the
transfers are so suspicious, or the procedures employed so prone to abuse,
or the purported benefits are so trivial or implausible, that courts should
presume an impermissible private purpose."' 176 Professor Daniel Kelly
suggests a framework for identifying situations where there is such a
risk.177

Finally, in elucidating the kind of pretextual takings Justice Kennedy
identified and the type of scrutiny it might entail, it is important to note that
178
not all takings that mask a hidden purpose are motivated by favoritism.
There are cases where, absent knowledge of the ultimate beneficiary, the
taking is still invalid, but not because the purpose is to confer a private
benefit; for example, in some cases, the underlying purpose may be one of
80
spite1 79 or ending an undesired use (and thus condemned in bad faith).1
3. Kennedy's Concurrence: Importance and Limitations
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Kelo is significant in its potential
promise of heightened judicial intervention when government agencies or

174. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
175. See id. (noting that factors present in Kelo--presence of a comprehensive plan,
benefits that are more than de minimis, unknown identities of the beneficiaries, and
compliance with procedural requirements-distinguish it from a case in which the taking
might be motivated by favoritism).
176. Id.
177. See generally Kelly, supra note 77. Kelly divides private involvement that might risk
favoritism into two stages: the precondemnation involvement in the form of identifying a
site for development and private involvement in the postcondemnation development of that
site. Id. at 20-24. Application of this standard is discussed further in Part II.B.3.
178. See, e.g., Earth Mgmt., Inc. v. Heard County, 283 S.E.2d 455, 460-61 (Ga. 1981)
(holding that a taking for the asserted purpose of building a park was actually an effort to
prevent the construction of a hazardous waste facility, and was done in bad faith). While this
case is a bad faith case, that the court looked behind the asserted purpose to find a furtive
motive provides precedential support for pretext case law.
179. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Carroll County v. City of Bremen, 347 S.E.2d 598 (Ga. 1986) (taking for
asserted purpose of building a training facility for police and fire employees masked an
effort to prevent construction of a water-waste facility and was in bad faith); Earth Mgmt.,
283 S.E.2d 455; Pheasant Ridge Assocs. v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 1152 (Mass.
1987) (taking for asserted purpose of creating a park was actually to prevent construction of
affordable housing and done in bad faith); Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Inst. for Rehab.
Inc., 673 A.2d 856 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995) (taking was an effort to block use of land as a
nursing facility and was in bad faith); see also Denver W. Metro. Dist. v. Geudner, 786 P.2d
434 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (taking was in bad faith when the condemnation of property was
for the benefit of the family who happened to control the condemning authority).
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condemning authorities abuse their authority. 18 l As Justice O'Connor put
it, Justice Kennedy failed to specify "what courts should look for in a case
how they will know if they have found it, and what to
with different facts,
' 182
do if they do not."
Indeed, some judges have criticized Justice Kennedy for engendering
confusion in lower courts. Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit opined that
Justice Kennedy's action is a[n] . . . example of the Court's tendency...
to disregard the consequences of its decisions for the lower courts that
have to apply them. If Kennedy had reservations concerning the majority
opinion that he was not willing to swallow, he should have concurred in
the judgment only; then183
the lower court judges and future litigants would
know where they stood.
The recent explosion of pretext claims 84 reveals a central paradox in
Justice Kennedy's concurrence: in rejecting heightened review in favor of
rational basis review for Public Use Clause claims, the Court seemingly
deprived itself of an adjudicative tool that might help it evaluate the record
and establish impermissible favoritism. It is thus difficult to meet Justice
Kennedy's criteria without "colliding with5 the no-heightened-level-of'8
review standard laid down by the majority."'
Even if Justice Kennedy did announce a new rule, his guidance is
incomplete. It has been criticized for failing to explain "[j]ust how 'the
86
record' could possibly establish 'undetected impermissible favoritism"'; 187
what evidence would be admissible for probing such an illicit motive;
how such evidence could be attained; 188 or how the evidence would trigger
heightened scrutiny that could give relief.189 Additionally, even if these
matters were resolved, a more serious problem is that once the rule was
clarified, it is unclear how it would have any efficacy if only the "'stupid
staffer' failed to comply.19 0 In other words, condemning authorities could
use Justice Kennedy's factors as a roadmap for what not to do and how to
take the precautions that would prevent a court from finding favoritism.

181. See, e.g., Franco v. Nat'l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 169 (D.C.
2007) (holding that Kelo recognized a pretext defense to takings); see also MHC Fin. Ltd.
P'ship v. City of San Rafael, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89195, *39-43 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5,
2006) (interpreting Kelo as providing grounds to invalidate a taking when the purpose is
pretextual).
182. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 502 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
183. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A PoliticalCourt,
119 HARV. L. REv. 31, 95 (2005).
184. See supra notes 31, 34, 35 and accompanying text.
185. Kanner, supra note 55, at 360.
186. Id. (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 492-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
187. Id. at 362.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 502 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025-26 & n.12 (1992)).
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Additionally, public officials are not likely to admit to an illicit purpose,'
and, as the post-Kelo revelations about Pfizer's role prior to the creation of
a development plan demonstrate, some information turns up only when it is
192
too late.

D. Pretext Case Law
Despite the limitations of Justice Kennedy's concurrence in failing to
clearly establish a new rule and in failing to explicate how it would work to
address takings motivated by favoritism, 193 federal and state jurisprudence
may provide guidance. This section is divided into two parts: First,
through an analysis of pretext case law, as well as a related area of
jurisprudence, bad faith claims, this section examines how courts analyze
Specifically, this section
claims of improperly-motivated takings.
investigates how courts distinguish the words motive and purpose, what it
means when a court infers motive, and also whether courts require evidence
that the government expected a specific benefit in return for favoritism.
Second, this section discusses one of the factors mentioned in Justice
Kennedy's concurrence, 194 namely that the benefits of the taking are not de
minimis, and then also discusses other factors state and federal courts have
examined as a basis for inferring pretext.
1. How Pretext Analysis Works
a. Motive and PurposeIs Not Inferredfrom Legislative Statements
Whether Kelo allows courts to examine the motives of legislatures brings
the discussion of pretext into an area where "courts use a confusing, and
often overlapping, array of terms." 195 For some, motive analysis is offlimits; Justice Antonin Scalia has written that the Court ought not consider
legislative motive or intent, 19 6 and the Second Circuit in Goldstein similarly
wrote that legislative judgments must be viewed objectively and that courts

191. See Kanner, supra note 55, at 362.
192. See Mann, supra note 27.
193. See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.

194. This section does not specifically discuss the remaining three factors-presence of a
comprehensive plan, that the identities of the private beneficiaries were not known prior to
the taking, and compliance with elaborate procedural requirements. See supra note 130 and
accompanying text. However, compliance with procedural requirements may be a factor that
subsumes other indicators of pretext, such as availability of alternatives, post hoc
justifications, sequence of events, and failure to negotiate or failed negotiations.
195. Lynda J. Oswald, Public Uses and Non-Uses: Sinister Schemes, Improper Motives,
and Bad Faith in Eminent Domain Law, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.L. REv. 45, 57 (2008).
196. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-37 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("To
look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that
does not exist.").
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may not "second-guess[] every detail in search of some illicit improper
197
motivation."
And yet some scholars argue that Justice Kennedy's discussion of pretext
calls for analysis of motive. Professor Gordon Young argues that Justice
Kennedy's reference to takings "'intended to favor a particular private
party,"' like Moreno's language about a "'bare congressional desire,"' is
"the language of mental states." 19 8 In drawing an analogy to race
discrimination cases, some authors argue that in rare circumstances calling
individual legislators to the stand to testify may be appropriate in assessing
pretext. 199 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed that
there is at least ambiguity here, that "'pretextual' is used to characterize the
public benefits that will flow from the taking, not the thought processes of
legislators or other government officials" but that, in Kelo, the "same
sentence [also] refers to intent . . . presumably the intent of the
legislators." 200 Nevertheless, the D.C. Court of Appeals did not resolve this
ambiguity. The court first noted the difficulty in "discovering the motives
and intentions of individual legislators," 20 1 adding that some federal courts
may expressly forbid such inquiry. 20 2 But then it punts, writing that "a
on benefits the public hopes to realize
reviewing court must focus primarily
20 3
from the proposed taking."
Distinctions between motive and intent on one hand, and purpose on the
other may be more confusing than helpful.20 4 Arguably, a court's analysis
of what the government is really trying to achieve-regardless of whether it
uses the terms desire, intention, motivation, purpose or, in the case of
Franco, "hopes" 2 05-may simply amount to a court's "search for adequate
reasons." 20 6 For example, under the Equal Protection Clause, "a statute will
fail scrutiny... if its purpose is to promote [or inhibit] religion," in other
words, if what is motivating legislators to enact the statute is the promotion
20 7
of religion.
Confusion over the use of subjective terms like intent, motive, purpose,
and hope may obscure what pretext claims really analyze: objective

197. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 63 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Brody v. Vill. of Port
Chester, 434 F.3d 121, 135 (2d Cir. 2005)).
198. Young, supra note 112, at 230-31 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469, 491 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534-35 (1973)).
199. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 71, at 116 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
200. Franco v. Nat'l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 173 (D.C. 2007).
201. Id. (citations omitted).
202. Id. at 173 n.l1.
203. Id. at 173 (contrasting its holding with Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487).
204. See Young, supra note 112, at 231.
205. Franco, 930 A.2d at 173.
206. Young, supra note 112, at 231.
207. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997) ("[W]e continue to ask whether the

government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion ... ").
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evidence of official acts and statements 20 8 or sequence of events, 20 9 not
necessarily legislators testifying as to what they believed they were
personally attempting to accomplish. 210 As the Massachusetts Supreme
Court put it in a case where there was an allegation that the taking was
motivated by bad faith, "we consider not only what [legislators] have said
but we also draw inferences concerning their intentions from what they
have done and what they have not done." 2 11 Thus, in Pheasant Ridge
Associates, Ltd. v. Town of Burlington,212 the statements of an individual
legislator were relevant to the issue of intent when, after no other council
members objected to his speech that revealed a motive of bad faith, the
council voted for the condemnation. In another case, Aaron, the sequence
of events was determinative: that the taking occurred following statements
made by the beneficiary of the taking who threatened to abandon its current
location-bringing economic harm to the city-unless it acquired fee title
2 13
over the plaintiffs property was evidence of improper purpose.
Furthermore, legislators may give testimony that points to facts that suggest
what parties, acting in concert, were trying to achieve. 214
b. Inferring Purpose/Motivefrom CircumstantialEvidence
Closely related to courts' examination of objective evidence that suggests
motive is courts' analysis of circumstantial evidence in inferring that a
particular scheme's purpose was to benefit a private party. 2 15 Even in 99
Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,2 16 where the
scheme that worked a private benefit was relatively straightforward, 2 17 the
court reinforced its conclusion that the taking was pretextual through

208. See, e.g., Pheasant Ridge Assocs. v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 1152, 1156
(Mass. 1987) (holding that in determining whether a taking is in in bad faith the court will
"draw inferences concerning their intentions from" their acts and nonacts).
209. Id. at 1157-58 & n.8 (noting that the town is not bound by remarks made by a
councilman revealing his awareness that the taking was an effort to achieve an illegitimate
purpose, but the town is bound when, after such remarks, it votes to take the property
without hearing the merits of the taking).
210. See id.
211. Id. at 1156.
212. 506 N.E. 2d 1152 (Mass. 1987).
213. Aaron v. Target Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1172 (E.D. Mo. 2003), rev'd on other
grounds, 357 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2004).
214. For example, in the post-Kelo expose, the reporter interviewed a high-ranking
official who was privy to the negotiations between Pfizer and the state prior to the
announcement of the redevelopment plan. The official explained that Pfizer "would not
have done the deal without the commitment to make the surrounding area more livable."
Mann, supra note 27 (internal quotation omitted).
215. While the favoritism in 99 Cents amounts to a relatively simple scheme-threat of
relocation-some schemes, like that in, In re 49 WB, LLC v. Village of Haverstraw, 839
N.Y.S.2d 127 (App. Div. 2007) are more complex. See infra notes 254-56 and
accompanying text.
216. 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
217. The court concluded that the city's purpose was to take private property in order to
appease the demands of an important commercial resident. Id. at 1129.
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circumstantial evidence. 2 18 In 99 Cents, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit found that the City of Lancaster's condemnation of 99 Cents
was an effort to retain Costco Wholesale. The drive to oust 99 Cents on
behalf of Costco began when Costco threatened to relocate from Lancaster
219
unless it acquired 99 Cents's property.
As 99 Cents demonstrates, the conclusion drawn is not that the asserted
public purpose fails the rationality test-although in 99 Cents it did not hurt
that it did fail that test. 220 Rather, there was enough evidence to conclude
pretext based on indicators of ulterior motive and evidence of an
insufficient asserted purpose. 22 1 In another case, In re 49 WB, LLC v.
Village of Haverstraw,222 the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division concluded that the taking of a private property for the purpose of
creating more affordable housing was pretextual where the underlying
purpose was favoritism. 2 23 The court wrote that "[t]he only rational
conclusion that can be drawn is that the Village's true purpose for
condemnation was to assist its waterfront developer in meeting" his
obligation to provide affordable housing-as though the facts could support
no other conclusion. 224 Thus, in pretext cases, taking a number of factors
together--often times including circumstantial evidence of acts and nonacts 225-enables courts to infer underlying purpose.
Commonly, in pretext cases, there tends to be no document or statement
that conclusively establishes that the primary or underlying purpose is to
confer a private benefit, 226-- in other words, there is no smoking gun. Even
in 99 Cents, while the court uncovered a town resolution that admitted the
only reason it enacted the taking "was to satisfy the private expansion
demands of Costco," 2 27 other evidence (albeit not conclusive proof) also
supported the conclusion that the taking was pretextual. For example, the
court found that Costco had alternate means for expanding and did not have
to displace 99 Cents; 228 there was no evidence on the record that the
asserted purpose-prevention of future blight-was the actual reason for
218. See id. at 1129-30; see infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text (discussing
specific evidence used to surmise pretext).
219. 99 Cents, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
220. Id. 1130-31 (finding that ending "future blight" is a not rational public purpose).
221. See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
222. 839 N.Y.S.2d 127, 141 (App. Div. 2007).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Pheasant Ridge Assocs., Ltd. v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 1152, 1156 (Mass.
1987); see supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing bad-faith cases).
226. Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts explained that even if a
legislator gave a speech demonstrating improper motives for the taking prior to a vote on the
taking, the court was not bound to conclude the taking was in bad faith. PheasantRidge, 506
N.E.2d at 1157-58 & n.8. However, a court may conclude that the taking is in bad faith if,
after hearing such an uncontested speech, there is no subsequent hearing on the merits for the
taking and the condemning authority votes in favor of the taking. Id.
227. 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123,
1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
228. Id.
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the condemnation at the time it was initiated; 229 and even if future blight
was the underlying reason for condemnation, it was not a valid public use
under state law. 230 Thus, absent conclusive proof, a court may infer pretext
by adding together a variety of circumstantial evidence.
c. No Evidence of Quid Pro Quo Required
Finally, 99 Cents is similar to other pretext cases in that the court was
able to unmask a scheme-the actual purpose of the taking-without
making a determination of whether the condemning authority desired to
receive a benefit in return for conferring one. 23 1 For example, the Ninth
Circuit did not need a record of bribes that the city expected from Costco,
or any other quid pro quo-all that was required was a showing that the
primary purpose was a private purpose. 232 Inquiry into purpose thus does
not go very deep: there is no investigation into or requirement of finding a
233
motivation for the actual purpose of the taking.
A hypothetical mentioned supra, in reference to an attempted pretextual
taking by Robert Moses, 234 illustrates that an act of favoritism-what
Black's Law Dictionary defines as "preference or selection, usually
invidious, based on factors other than merit" 235-may even be rooted in a
convergence of ideology on the part of the condemner and the benefiting
party. In the case of Moses and Macy's, it is possible that Moses attempted
to secure the uptown location for Macy's because his personal vision of
economic development meshed with the store's business. 2 36 But even if the
favoritism emerged from a different source, what the Delaware Court of
Chancery might call Moses's "'thickness' of the social and institutional
connections" 2 37 with New York City's wealthy and powerful, 238 in either
case there would be favoritism without a specific expectation of return of
229. Id. at 1130.
230. Id. at 1131.
231. In concluding that the "condemnation efforts rest[ed] on nothing more than the
desire to achieve the naked transfer of property from one private party to another" the Ninth
Circuit explained that the city desired to retain a major commercial resident, but nowhere in

the opinion did the court mention whether the city expected recompense for using eminent
domain. Id. at 1129.
232. Id.
233. However, without a showing of the reason for the actual purpose, the analysis may
be flawed. If, in the case of 99 Cents, the motivation for conferring a benefit to Costco
Wholesale was to placate an important corporate resident, one could infer that the city's
immediate purpose was to confer a private benefit. But it is also plausible that this
immediate purpose served the larger public purpose of preventing damage to the local
economy through loss of a major commercial presence.
234. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
235. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 104 at 641.
236. CARO, supra note 71, at 741-42.
237. See In re Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d 917, 936 (Del. Ch. 2003) (explaining that assessing
corporate conflicts of interest on the basis of social relations constituted a departure from
traditional analysis in which the key focus is on "the effect on one's personal wealth" in
inquiries into independence of board members).
238. See CARO, supra note 71 at 753-54.
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benefit. As the Moses example illustrates, the relationship may be so
complex that proving quid pro quo is virtually impossible. Such examples
support the Ninth Circuit's practice of looking for favoritism without
requiring finding the particular reason for it.
2. Factors Mentioned in Kennedy's Concurrence and Other Factors
Indicating Pretext
Building on the methodology examined in the previous section, this
section examines factors-the kinds of circumstantial evidence-courts use
This section does not attempt an exhaustive
to ascertain pretext.
examination of the main factors courts have found relevant in inferring
pretext-including whether the taking or justification for the taking is post
hoc, 239 the content of legislative statements, 240 or the overall sequence of
events 24 1-but attempts to illustrate what courts dealing with claims
actually do. Potentially, two of the factors discussed in this sectionavailability of alternatives to eminent domain and failure to negotiate or
evidence of failed negotiations-may be encompassed by Justice
Kennedy's reference to compliance with "with elaborate procedural
requirements." 242 Nevertheless, an illustrative discussion of such examples
demonstrates the flexibility in courts' analyses of pretext. Additionally, this
section also discusses the relevance of one of the factors Justice Kennedy
239. Post hoc justifications occur in cases like Goldstein, where the condemning authority
added a reason to take the property-to end blight-after it made the decision to condemn.
516 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2008); see also infra note 319 and accompanying text (discussing
pretextual factors in Goldstein). A different kind of post hoc action, but nonetheless
indicative of pretext, is the addition of the takings area after a comprehensive plan is already
in place. See, e.g., David Schultz, What's Yours Can Be Mine: Are There Any Private
Takings After Kelo v. City of New London?, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 195, 233
(2006) (noting that in one case "the late addition of the property to the plan appeared to be an
opportunistic move on the part of a specific business that wished to expand" and looked
suspicious to the court).
240. Some courts have relied on legislative statements to infer pretext. See, e.g.,
Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Land with Improvements, 521 A.2d 227, 233 (Del. 1986)
(letter from condemning authority to would-be beneficiary newspaper company, explaining
that the city was "'willing to accommodate all your needs,"' was evidence that the city used
the condemning authority to entice the would-be beneficiary of the taking to remain in
Wilmington). Also, in a bad faith case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found
it significant that the condemning authority's interest in the takings area arose suddenly. See
Pheasant Ridge Assocs. v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 1152, 1157 (Mass. 1987).
241. Some courts have held that events leading to the condemning authority's interest in
using eminent domain-for example, whether the decision to take private property followed
discussion with a potential private beneficiary-is evidence of a "motivating factor" and thus
pretext. See, e.g., Wilmington ParkingAuth., 521 A.2d at 230 ("development of the interest
of the [condemning authority] in the project provided insight into the 'motivating factor' in
the decision of the [condemning authority] to proceed with" taking property to give NewsJournal Company extra parking in order to entice them to stay in Wilmington)).
242. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. Justice Anthony Kennedy does not
specifically mention that availability of alternatives and failed negotiations or failure to
negotiate as encompassed in his hypothetical test. However, Part III argues for the
importance of considering such factors. See infra Part III.A.2 (arguing for an expansive view
of the kinds of evidence courts should review in ascertaining pretext).
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mentions-that the benefits are not de minimis-also
in an effort to
24 3
illustrate how courts might apply such a concept.
a. The "economic benefits of the project cannot be characterizedas de
minimis"
In his Kelo concurrence, Justice Kennedy mentions that if the economic
benefits of a project are de minimis the taking might justify a more
demanding standard of scrutiny.244 But since the benefits in Kelo245
development of New London's tax base and addition of jobs to the city were not de minimis, the Court gave little indication of what would
constitute de minimis economic benefits. Specifically, if the project
proposes noneconomic benefits, it is unclear how courts will ascertain
whether those benefits are trivial, and how far courts should go in
measuring whether a project's benefits are trivial. 246 This portion of Justice
Kennedy's concurrence has been criticized as adding ambiguity because he
does not demarcate the line between de minimis and non-de minimis
benefits. 247 Illustrating ways courts have concluded that the absence of
benefits-or significant benefits-may be a useful tool for future litigants.
Some takings may result in benefits that are so disproportionate to the
harm of depriving an individual of her property or so ephemeral as to
suggest that the motive is favoritism. 24 8 The court in Casino Reinvestment
Development Authority v. Banin249 came close to such a finding, but
stopped short of finding pretext when it did not have enough evidence to
conclude that the primary purpose was to confer private benefits. 250 In
Casino, the court found that lack of restrictions on property ceded to the
25 1
developer, Donald Trump, amounted to granting him a blank check.
Although the court held that there was not enough evidence to surmise
pretext, the benefits were so expansive as to suggest that the condemnation
"primarily benefits a private party with only incidental public benefit. '252
Other courts in future cases, with sufficient evidence, and assessing the

243. See infra Part I.D.2.a-c.
244. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

245. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.

247. See Kelly, supra note 77, at 9. Daniel B. Kelly suggests that a court concluding
pretext from de minimis benefits might merely find that the taking is not warranted because
of the risk that the taking is pretextual, not because it actually is pretextual. Id. at 10.
248. See In re Aspen Creek Estates, Ltd. v. Town of Brookhaven, 848 N.Y.S.2d 214, 222
(App. Div. 2007) (Lifson, J., dissenting) ("[T]he potential benefit to the public is so

disproportionate and ephemeral when compared to the actual benefit conferred on the tenant
that the proposed taking cannot be justified as an efficient advancement of the stated public
policy.").
249. 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998).

250. Id. at 104.
251. Id. at 111.
252. Id. at 104.
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"consequences and effects of the proposed project ' 2 53 might conclude that
the paucity of benefit implies favoritism.
In In re 49 WB, in which the court found pretext, the court concluded that
2 54
the public would be better off without the taking than with it.
Scrutinizing the record, the New York appellate court unearthed a
convoluted scheme whereby, in taking private property and giving it to a
nonprofit developer for the purpose of developing affordable housing, the
village's condemnation would actually result in the construction of lessaffordable housing than if the property were not condemned. 255 This
scheme, the court held, illustrates that the village's purpose in condemning
property for the benefit of building affordable housing was "merely
pretextual, and hence, improper" and that "[t]he only rational conclusion
that can be drawn is that the village's true purpose for condemnation was to
assist its waterfront developer." 256 On balance, the public benefits that
would be achieved by the taking were de minimis-the consequences were
"instead actually harmful"-when compared to the benefits if the property
were not condemned, and were thus evidence of favoritism. 257 This
comparison demonstrates that In re 49 WB goes even further than mere
analysis of the net benefits; rather, the court balances proposed benefits
against the alternatives in assessing the degree of benefit. Such analysis
could give guidance to future courts struggling to apply Justice Kennedy's
concurrence.
b. Availability ofAlternatives
In at least three cases, two federal and one state, the availability of
alternative methods for achieving the same asserted public purpose
provided courts a basis to infer pretext. In the seminal pretext case, 99
Cents, the Ninth Circuit found that the city did not have to condemn the
plaintiffs property in order to retain an important commercial tenant,
because "Costco could have easily expanded [in the shopping center] onto
'25 8
adjacent property without displacing 99 Cents at all but refused to do so."
253. Id.
254. In re 49 WB, LLC v. Vill. of Haverstraw 839 N.Y.S.2d 127, 140 (App. Div. 2007)
("In other words, by exercising eminent domain, the Village achieves fewer affordable
housing units for its residents and volunteers, whereas by not condemning the site, the
Village would realize a greater number of affordable housing units.").
255. The property would be condemned and given to a nonprofit organization, which, the
court found, had an agreement with a developer that would allow the developer to fulfill its
affordable housing construction requirements. Id. at 238. Through a loophole in a city
resolution, the developer could satisfy its affordable housing construction requirements (at
lower cost than if it built it itself) by donating money to the nonprofit Housing Opportunity
for Growth, Advancement and Revitalization, Inc. (HOGAR); those funds, in turn, would be
used to build affordable housing, and then HOGAR would use the developer's donation to
purchase the condemned property. Id. at 241.
256. Id. at 243.
257. Id. at 242.
258. 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123,
1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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Based on this evidence, inter alia, the court concluded the "condemnation
efforts rest on nothing more than the desire to achieve the naked transfer of
2 59
property from one private party to another."
In a separate case, Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress
Redevelopment Agency, 260 also dealing with taking property for the benefit
of a Costco, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
held that there was sufficient evidence of pretext to raise a fair question on
the merits. 2 61 There, the court found it possible that (another) Costco could
have expanded its store without requiring the condemnation of adjacent
property. 262 This evidence was enough for the court to conclude that the
city was trying to appease Costco, not that its purpose was to generate
revenue. 263 In a third case, In re 49 WB, discussed supra, the court
supported its finding of pretext with evidence of alternative means: that a
nonprofit organization that was to benefit from the taking could have
continued its community outreach programs without taking fee title to the
condemned property-contrary to the opinion of the condemning
authority. 264 In other words, the public benefits sought could be achieved
without the use of eminent domain. Thus, while it is not required that there
are no alternatives to condemnation in order to uphold the condemnation,
these courts used this fact-the absence of what the Institute for Justice
calls a "last resort" 265-as evidence that supports a finding of pretext.
c. FailedNegotiations or Failureto Negotiate with the Property Owner
Courts may infer that favoritism is the real reason for the taking when
either the condemning authority or the beneficiary of the taking fails to
negotiate (or failed in negotiating) with the condemned property owner. In
a series of cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth and Eighth
Circuits-99 Cents, 266 Aaron,267 and Cottonwooc

68

-the

courts found

evidence that the taking resulted after the ultimate beneficiary of the
condemnation failed in negotiating a buyout of the property. In 99 Cents,
the condemning authority was enlisted-seemingly by way of threat of
relocation-by Costco to condemn the property after Costco's negotiations
with the property owner of the 99 Cents location failed. 269 A similar chain

259. Id.
260. 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002).

261. Id. at 1230.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1229-30.
264. In re 49 WB, LLC v. Vill. of Haverstraw, 839 N.Y.S.2d 127, 139 (App. Div. 2007).
BERLINER, supra note 3, at 5.
266. 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2001).

265.

267. 269 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1167 (E.D. Mo. 2003), rev'don othergrounds, 357 F.3d 768

(8th Cir. 2004) (finding that Target's effort to get city to take the property for its benefit
resulted after failed negotiations).
268. 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1214.
269. 99 Cents, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
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of events unfolded in several other cases. 270 In some cases, the city does
27 1
not even attempt to negotiate a purchase from the property owner.
E. Legislative Deference and the Difficulty in Prevailingon a Pretext
Claim
While the previous section noted a handful of state and federal court
cases where the property owner successfully proved a taking was
pretextual, the Supreme Court's requirement of legislative deference can
often prove fatal to pretext claims. 272 When rational basis review is the
standard, the presumption of permissibility "usually motivates trial judges
to see no evil, hear no evil, and speak no evil in such cases, even when
[such cases] fail the 'smell test.' ' 273 In some ways, Kelo itself is an
example of how the combination of legislative deference and the general
difficulty of discovering an underlying purpose are at times insurmountable
obstacles. 274 The fact that evidence suggesting pretext was not found in
Kelo, a case in which there was extensive inquiry into the taking, but the
trial court did not discover the full extent of dealings which might have
persuaded it to find pretext, suggests that courts may be less capable of
finding pretext when there is even less inquiry than Kelo's seven-day bench
275
trial.
That the lower court in Kelo conducted extensive inquiry into the taking
was a fact of no small consequence to the Court. In confidently noting that
New London's purpose was not an example of pretext, Justice Kennedy
based his concurrence and faith on a substantial evidentiary hearing: "Here,
the trial court conducted a careful and extensive inquiry into whether, in
fact, the development plan is of primary benefit" to Corcoran Jennison, the
developer, "and in that regard, only of incidental benefit to the city."' 276 On
the basis of this record, Justice Kennedy noted the absence of a factor that
might have indicated pretext-that "[t]he identities of most of the private
beneficiaries were unknown at the time the city formulated its plans. '2 77
With a more complete record, Justice Kennedy might not have found that
New London's "development plan was intended to revitalize the local

270. See, e.g., Sw. I11.Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., LLC, 768 N.E.2d 1, 10 (I11.2002)
(holding that a taking initiated after the private beneficiary's failure to negotiate with
property owner corroborated development authority's intention to act as default broker);
Aaron, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.
271. See, e.g., Earth Mgmt., Inc. v. Heard County, 283 S.E.2d 455, 460 (Ga. 1981).
272. See, e.g., infra notes 345-51 (discussing the Second Circuit's failure to find pretext
in Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008)).
273. Kanner, supra note 55, at 362.
274. See supra note 27.
275. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005) (noting that Kelo was a
bench trial conducted over seven days); see also Mann, supra note 27; supra notes 135-39
and accompanying text.
276. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
277. Id. at 493.
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economy, not to serve the interests of Pfizer" and may have invalidated the
278
taking.
Given the importance of conducting an extensive inquiry in building a
pretext claim, judicial procedure can assume substantive importance. The
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, in Aaron, dismissed
the defendants' Younger v. Harris2 79 abstention defense because the
summary nature of the alternative proceeding, without discovery, would
have impaired the plaintiff property owners' ability to successfully raise a
pretext claim. 280 For this court, a summary hearing of the property owners'
claims would make or break their constitutional claim.
Other courts have applied the "extensive inquiry" element of Kelo in a
more direct fashion by deciding to hear a pretext claim. In one case, MHC
FinancingLtd. Partnershipv. City of San Rafael,2 81 the "extensive inquiry"
reasoning was grounds to survive a motion for summary judgment against
the property owners. 282 Thus, with pretext claims, the distinction between
procedure and substantive law can blur: a controversy over the adequacy of
the pleadings has substantive significance because it may determine
hard-to-get evidence may
whether the pretext claim is heard, and whether
283
be adduced via discovery to support the claim.
Yet the post-Kelo backstory is evidence, if anything, of how difficult it is
to search out these claims. 284 Whether this is a result that the Court need
merely tolerate or whether it is an indication of the need for courts to hear
these claims is at the center of current debate. 2 85 However, this anecdote
suggests that courts might consider a full range of tools that have proved
successful in balancing deference to legislatures with a desire to ferret out
286
pretext.

278. Id. at 492 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
279. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
280. Aaron v. Target Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1171 (E.D. Mo. 2003), rev'd on other
grounds, 357 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2004). In Aaron, the defendant (property owners) asserted
that the Supreme Court's decision in Younger v. Harris precluded a federal court from
addressing claims that were pending in state court, absent "very unusual circumstances," an
argument the court dismissed. Id. at 1170 (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44).
281. No. 00-3785, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89195 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2006).
282. See id. at *43. On this point, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California summoned Kelo: "The trial court in Kelo satisfied Justice Kennedy's standard
through 'careful and extensive inquiry into whether, in fact, the development plan is of
primary benefit to the developer... [and] only incidental benefit to the City.' Such an
inquiry will likewise be necessary in the present action." Id. (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491).
283. See infra Part II.A.1.
284. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
285. Indeed, the Second Circuit in Goldstein implied it was willing to tolerate such
outcomes. See infra Part II.A.2.a.
286. See supra Part I.D.2; see also infra notes 573-75 and accompanying text.
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II. DID KELO CHANGE ANYTHING? IF So, How SHOULD COURTS REVIEW
PRETEXT CLAIMS AND WHAT FACTORS MIGHT THEY CONSIDER IN
ASCERTAINING PRETEXT?

This part begins by contrasting two decisions, the Second Circuit's
opinion in Goldstein287 and the D.C. Court of Appeals' opinion in
Franco,28 8 in order to show the conflict among courts over whether Kelo
announced a new rule calling for more aggressive review of takings alleged
to be pretextual or whether, as Goldstein holds, it changed nothing.
Assuming that the Kelo Court called for heightened scrutiny of alleged
pretextual takings, this part then considers four possibilities for heightened
290
scrutiny of pretext claims: strict scrutiny review, 2 89 means-ends scrutiny,
a tripartite burden-shifting test 29 1 and process scrutiny, 292 which scrutinizes
the process leading up to the condemnation in order to determine whether
the asserted purpose is the actual purpose.
A. Apply Substantive Weight or Not? The Franco and Goldstein Conflict
At a most basic level, two leading and recent cases addressing pretext are
divided as to which pleading standard should govern pretext claims in the
takings context. In Goldstein, the Second Circuit dismissed a pretext claim
on the pleadings, 293 while in Franco, the D.C. Court of Appeals did not
dismiss a similar claim with similar facts. 294 Perhaps decisive in the
opposing outcomes between these courts was the Second Circuit's use of a
"plausibility pleading standard," adapted from Twombly, 2 95 and Franco's
296
use of Conley's less stringent notice pleading standard.
287. 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
288. 930 A.2d 160 (D.C. 2007).
289. See infra Part II.B. 1.
290. See infra Part II.B.2.
291. See infra Part II.B.3.
292. See infra Part II.C.
293. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 56-57. In reaching this conclusion, the Goldstein court
applied the Twombly plausibility standard, which holds that "'[f]actual allegations [are]
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true."' Id. at 56 (quoting Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.
Ct. 1955, 1968 (2007)).
294. Franco v. Nat'l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 174-75 (D.C. 2007).
The court held that "a motion to strike a defense as insufficient will be denied 'if [the
defense] fairly presents a question of law or fact which the court ought to hear."' Id. at 166
(quoting SEC v. Gulf& Western Indus. Inc., 502 F. Supp. 343, 345 (D.D.C 1980) (alteration
in original)). Unlike in Goldstein, the Franco v. NationalCapitalRevitalization Corp. court
rejected applying Twombly, and instead applied a pleading standard derived from Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Franco, 930 A.2d at 166 n.6. However, the Franco court
amended this pleading standard to excise the "no set of facts" language in Conley that
Twombly expressly overruled. Id. (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45).
295. See supra note 11. In Twombly, the suit was brought by a group of subscribers to
local telephone and internet providers against a group of region telephone monopolies, called
"Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers" (ILECs) for violations of the Sherman Act. Id. at
1961. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the ILECs engaged in "parallel conduct"
in their service areas to stifle the entry of competitors (CLECs) to the local market, and that
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But, apart from the pleading standard issue, there appears to be a more
substantive debate between Franco and both the district and appellate
courts in Goldstein.297 Fundamentally, these courts split as to whether
deference to legislative judgments should govern review of pretext claims
or whether pretext claims apply only to cases where economic development
is among the asserted purposes. On one side is Franco, where, in rejecting
National Capital Revitalization Corporation's (NCRC) Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court was
motivated by the belief that legislatures are not always deserving of
deference. 298 On the other side is the Second Circuit in Goldstein, which
interpreted the property owners' pretext claim through a prism of deference
299
to legislative judgments.
Franco involved the property of Samuel Franco, owner of the Discount
Mart in the Skyland Shopping Center in southeast Washington, D.C. 300 In
1998, the city created the NCRC, which was charged with "job creation by
developing and updating a strategic economic development plan for the
District.

'30 1

Later, in 2002, the NCRC entered into a Joint Development

Agreement with four private developers to redevelop the Skyland Shopping
Center, agreeing to make good faith efforts to acquire any property by
purchase before exercising the power of eminent domain.30 2 Then, in 2004,
the NCRC submitted to the city council a bill to grant it the power to
condemn properties in the Skyland mall, Franco's property among them.
The bill was passed a month later, but the version passed included a
segment that was not present in the original and included findings that the
30 3
shopping center "is a blighting factor" in the surrounding neighborhood.
The following year, the NCRC filed a complaint to condemn Franco's
property, which he defended against with, inter alia, a pretext claim. 30 4 As
will be discussed, many of these facts are strikingly similar to those in
Goldstein, but the split is more than just procedural: it is marked by
opposing underlying attitudes toward the pretext claims altogether.
1. Procedural Split: Whether or Not to Apply a Plausibility Pleading
Standard
Most narrowly, Franco and Goldstein appear to evince a conflict over
pleading standards. In both the district and appellate court decisions in
the ILECs restrained trade by agreeing not to compete with one another. Id.; see also A.
Benjamin Spencer, PlausibilityPleading,49 B.C. L. REv 431, 439-40 (2008).
296. Franco, 930 A.2d at 166-67 n.6.
297. See infra Part II.A.2.
298. Franco, 930 A.2d at 169 ("Kelo recognized that there may be situations where a
court should not take at face value what the legislature has said.").
299. See infra notes 345-51 and accompanying text.
300. Id. at 162.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 163.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 162.
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Goldstein the courts applied Twombly's plausibility pleading standard. 30 5
In Franco, however, the D.C. Court of Appeals applied the more flexible
notice pleading standard derived from the Court's seminal decision in
Conley.306 To contrast these standards, one author notes that Twombly
departed from precedent by holding that "factual allegations must paint a
plausible picture of liability," which is more than just requiring that the
plaintiff make factual allegations. 30 7 In deciding Twombly, the "Court...
expressly stated that allegations that are 'merely consistent with' liability
leave only a depiction that 'stays in neutral territory' and 'stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility."' 30 8 Thus, where a court applies
Twombly, plaintiffs must go further in their presentation of facts in their
pleading in order to survive dismissal.
This Note does not undertake an in-depth analysis of the Court's
Twombly decision and whether that decision, which covered an antitrust
conspiracy claim, is applicable to takings law. Suffice it to say that
applying that decision outside of the context of antitrust law has engendered
controversy. 30 9 However, what is important about applying Twombly to
pretext cases is the effect that such a standard has on preventing pretext
310
claims from surviving motions to dismiss and thus from being heard.
Additionally, a court's decision to apply Twombly's plausibility standard
may demonstrate its underlying attitude toward pretext claims, just as other
courts' application of Twombly, in an attempt to weed out what courts
consider frivolous claims, conveys an underlying attitude about those types
31
of claims. l
Twombly's plausibility pleading standard is more stringent than Conley's
pleading standard because a "plaintiff may no longer survive a motion to
dismiss if she pleads facts that are equivocal, meaning the allegations are
consistent both with the asserted illegality and with an innocent alternate
explanation." 312 Another court, also applying Twombly to a pretext claim
and interpreting the Eastern District of New York's decision in Goldstein,
explained that the pleading must go beyond legal allegations by alleging
305. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2008); Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F.
Supp. 2d 254, 286-90 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
306. The Francocourt explained that this pleadings standard, discussed infra in note 321,
is taken from SEC v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 343, 345 (D.D.C. 1980),
which, in turn, the Franco court derived from the Court's decision in Conley, 355 U.S. 41,
45 (1957) (applying a notice pleading standard). Franco,930 A.2d at 166 & n.6.
307. Spencer, supra note 295, at 444.
308. Id. at 445 (quoting Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007)).
309. See generally Amanda Sue Nichols, Note, Alien Tort Statute Accomplice Liability
Cases: Should Courts Apply the Plausibility Pleading Standard of Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly?, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2177 (2008).

310. See id. at 2221-22 (discussing the likelihood that more cases will be dismissed if
courts were to apply Twombly's plausibility pleading standard than if they were to apply
Conley's notice pleading standard).
311. See id. at 2204-05 (discussing courts' application of Twombly in cases "'where
massive discovery is likely to create unacceptable settlement pressures' (quoting Iqbal v.
Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d. Cir. 2007))).
312. Spencer, supra note 295, at 445.
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actual facts that may make a legal conclusion plausible: "Plaintiffs' bald
legal allegations of arbitrariness and irrationality need not be accepted by
this Court. Rather, Plaintiffs' factual allegations must be sufficient to make
such a legal conclusion 'plausible.' ' 3 13 In other words, "because private
transfers to achieve public purposes are legal under the Kelo doctrine, the
defendants' conduct was as consistent with lawful behavior as with
3 14
unlawful behavior."
The stringency of Twombly's plausibility standard means that a court
granting a motion to dismiss under Twombly can do so even if the plaintiff
alleges specific facts consistent with its legal claim. Applying Twombly,
the Second Circuit held that, because the facts alleged included a private
transfer but also conceded a number of accepted public benefits, there were
"no 'plausible' accusations of favoritism. '3 15 While the Goldstein court
noted that the plaintiffs pled "conclusory" allegations, 3 16 the plaintiffs also
made allegations not present in Kelo, including that the beneficiary of the
takings proposed the redevelopment plan in the first instance, 3 17 that the
city departed from normal procedure in accepting the developer's bid, 3 18
and that the public purposes asserted to justify the takings (namely, to end
3 19
blight) were asserted post hoc.
The pleading standard adopted by the Franco court, on the other hand, is
permissive in allowing complaints to survive motions to dismiss.320 The
court explained that, under the standard it applied, "a motion to strike a
defense as insufficient will be denied 'if [the defense] fairly presents a
question of law or fact which the court ought to hear,' 32 1 although the

313. CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. N.J. Transit Corp., No. 06-2428, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
64155, at *47 (N.J. Aug. 30, 2007) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974).
314. Brigham Boulris, supra note 34, at 967.
315. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56, 64 n.10 (2d Cir. 2008). The U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey in CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. N.J. Transit Corp. and the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York in Goldstein found support for applying
this standard outside of the context of an antitrust case and to a takings case based on Justice
Kennedy's use of the word "plausible" in Kelo. CBS Outdoor, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
64155, at *47-48 (finding that Justice Kennedy's instruction in Kelo that a court must find
"'a plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism,"' (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. 469, 491
(Kennedy, J., concurring)), is ".consistent with the rule that a plaintiff must allege 'enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible' in order to survive a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim."' (quoting Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 288 (E.D.N.Y.
2007)). Even though Kelo was decided before Twombly, as the CBS court notes, Kennedy
did use the term "plausible" in reference to pretext. Thus, argued the Eastern District of
New York, the "plausibility standard recognized in Twombly arguably applied to eminentdomain cases even before Twombly was decided." Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 289.
316. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 56.
317. Id. at64.
318. Id. at 56.
319. Id.
320. Nichols, supra note 309, at 2221.
321. Franco v. Nat'l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 166 (D.C. 2007)
(quoting SEC v. Gulf& W. Indus. Inc., 502 F. Supp. 343, 345 (D.D.C 1980)).
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court adds that not just any allegation would survive a motion to dismiss. 322

On the issue of conclusory allegations-allegations that do not plead facts
but merely draw legal conclusions about general conduct-the Franco court
is, in fact, in agreement with the Second Circuit. 323 Nevertheless, the
Franco court, applying the Conley pleading standard, determined that the
defendant pled sufficient factual allegations to support his claim. 324 These
allegations included several of the same types of facts the plaintiffs in
Goldstein alleged 325: that the government discussed the project with the
private beneficiaries prior to announcing plans to redevelop and that the
326
government asserted the blight findings at the last minute.
In support of its decision to reject the motion to dismiss, the Francocourt
noted that an extensive inquiry, occurring over the course of a seven-day
bench trial, supported Kelo's holding. 327 It is unclear to what extent the
Franco court's decision not to dismiss the pretext defense was informed by
the fact that Kelo rested on such an "extensive record"; 32 8 perhaps the court
wanted to give Franco the same assurances that Susette Kelo received. It
may be a signal of the court's intent that, after discussing the extensive
record in Kelo, it noted that plaintiffs "must in some circumstances be
allowed to allege and to demonstrate that the stated public purpose for the
' '329
condemnation is pretextual.
Taken together, it is unclear to what extent the pleading standards
controlled the outcomes in Franco and Goldstein. Both courts agreed that
merely conclusory allegations are not enough, yet, in both cases, the
property owners alleged specific facts consistent with the conclusion that
the takings were pretextual. 330 The more exacting plausibility standard in
Goldstein may have kept the court from allowing claims that did have a
factual basis to go forward. 33 1 Thus, it is unclear, even given these
322. Franco, 930 A.2d at 170 ("These allegations may be too conclusory by themselves
to survive a motion to strike .... ).
323. Compare id. (explaining that merely conclusory allegations may not survive a
motion to strike), with Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63 (finding that conclusory allegations are not
enough to survive a motion to dismiss).
324. Franco, 930 A.2d at 170.
325. See supra notes 317-19 and accompanying text.
326. Franco, 930 A.2d at 170-71. To compare these allegations with similar factual
allegations in Goldstein, see infra notes 361-65 and accompanying text (discussing the
Metropolitan Transit Authority's (MTA) (a New York State public benefit corporation) deal
with Ratner prior to a competitive process); supra note 319 and accompanying text
(discussing the condemning authority's post hoc addition of blight as a justification for
condemnation).
327. Franco, 930 A.2d at 169.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Compare id. at 170 (stating that Franco made many specific factual allegations to
support his claim), with Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(finding that the factual allegations in the property owners' pretext claims were "as
consistent with lawful behavior as with unlawful behavior").
331. It is also possible that these allegations would not have survived the more relaxed
pleading standard, like that in Franco. See Nichols, supra note 309, at 2191 ("In reality,
notice pleading still requires an appropriate number of facts supporting the allegation, such
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opposing pleading standards, whether courts are evaluating pretext claims
consistently. Nevertheless, these cases highlight how the choice of
pleading standard may have an impact on whether a pretext claim survives
the pleading stage.
2. Substantive Split: Did Kelo Change Anything?
In substance, both the Goldstein and Franco courts agree that just
because a legislature declares that there is a public purpose for a
condemnation does not mean that the owner is foreclosed as a matter of law
from demonstrating that the asserted purpose is pretextual. 332 Furthermore,
both courts acknowledged the logic that "it is not enough for the protesting
landowner to demonstrate that private parties will benefit from the
project. '333 But conflict emerges over how strong the claims need to be for
a court to critique-or at least hear claims critiquing-the process by which
eminent domain is granted. 334 This issue over how extreme the allegation
of favoritism must be in order for the court to hear the claim 335 overlaps
significantly with the discussion of pleading standards addressed in the
preceding section. 336 Yet, it is both of these courts' attitudes toward and
interpretation of Kelo that reveals a more substantive split over whether
courts are inclined to allow pretext claims to overcome deference to
legislative judgment.
a. Goldstein: The Narrow View
As stated supra, it is possible that the factual allegations in Goldstein
were so weak that the pretext claim would have failed under any heightened
level of review. 337 Nevertheless, several key aspects of the Goldstein
that there is adequate information regarding the claim for relief for the defendant to
answer."). Similarly, the converse may also be true: with Franco, the factual allegations
were strong enough to pass muster under the Twombly standard.
332. Compare Franco, 930 A.2d at 168, with Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 64 & n.10.
333. Franco, 930 A.2d at 172; accord Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 60 ("Once we discern a
valid public use to which the project is rationally related, it 'makes no difference that the
property will be transferred to private developers, for the power of eminent domain is merely
the means to the end."' (quoting Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev.
Corp., 771 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1985))).
334. See supra Part II.A. I.
335. See Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 64 ("[The plaintiffs] have failed to allege ... any specific
defect in the Project that would be so egregious as to render it, on any fair reading of
precedent, 'palpably without reasonable foundation."' (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984))).
336. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
337. See Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 64. In discussing Goldstein, this Note focuses only on the
mere pretext portion of the decision, not on the Second Circuit's discussion of "sole
purpose." See id. at 57-60. The Second Circuit (and the Eastern District of New York)
found that in addition to failing to allege that the taking was a mere pretext, the plaintiffs
also failed to allege facts plausible to support the conclusion that the sole purpose was to
render a private benefit to Ratner. Id. at 60. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the
taking effected two other constitutional violations. First, they argued that, in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, the Project provided no rational basis for elevating the status of one
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decision demonstrate that granting the motion to dismiss may have been
due to the court's reluctance to buck deference to legislative judgment: its
overall adherence to deference to legislative judgments; 338 the import the
court attaches to the fact that the plaintiffs conceded that the project might
generate public benefits 339 ; its treatment of the facts plaintiffs allege 340 ; its
narrow reading of the pretext cases cited in Kelo 34 1; and that it treats the
factors in Justice Kennedy's concurrence as advisory. 342 Taken together,
343
these factors suggest a court that is hostile to pretext claims.
Although Goldstein acknowledged the possibility of a category of pretext
claims, 344 the court held that it would review such claims in light of
deference to the legislative branch: "[T]he issue of pretext must be
understood in light of ...the [Kelo] holding.., which... reaffirmed the
'longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this

field'

. . .

.345

The Second Circuit understood that the Court's reference to

such claims must be read both as confined to cases where the asserted
purpose is economic development and Kelo's core commitment to
deference. 34 6 Thus, under Goldstein, pretext claims receive the same lowscrutiny review that any other claim under the Public Use Clause
347
receives.
Behind the court's resistance to granting discovery to the property
owners was its fear of launching a full judicial inquiry into the subjective
motives of officials who supported the project, 348 an inquiry that the court
held was not permitted by Kelo or its forebears. 349 The court concluded
that the role of federal courts in reviewing takings is limited to "'patrolling
the borders' of takings. 350 The court's "border" approach and its
reluctance to hear claims that it associated with analyzing the subjective
motives of public officials raise serious questions given that the Kelo
group of citizens (Ratner) while singling out private land owners "for unequal, adverse
treatment." Id. at 54 n.3 (internal citations and quotation omitted). Second, they arguedand the court quickly dismissed-that the defendants violated their due process rights by
circumventing the local review process for eminent domain plans. Id.
338. See infra notes 345-51 and accompanying text.
339. See infra notes 352-56 and accompanying text.
340. See infra notes 357-67 and accompanying text.
341. See infra notes 366-69 and accompanying text.
342. See infra notes 358-65 and accompanying text.
343. Thomas, supra note 22.
344. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 63 (2d Cir. 2008).
345. Id. at 61 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005)).
346. The court wrote Kelo "self-identifi[ed] with a tradition of public use jurisprudence
that. .. 'has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording
legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings
power."' Id. (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483).
347. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 62 (rejecting "the notion that.., the Kelo majority sought sub
silentio to overrule... over a century of precedent and to require federal courts in all cases
to give close scrutiny to the mechanics of a taking.., as a means to gauge the purity of the
motives of the various government officials who approved it" (citing Kelo, 545 U.S at 483)).
348. Id. at 63 (citing Brody v. Vill. of Port Chester, 434 F.3d 121, 136 (2d Cir. 2005)).
349. See id. at 62.
350. Id. at 63 (quoting Brody, 434 F.3d at 135).
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majority and concurrence were both skeptical of takings marked by
35 1
impermissible favoritism.
It also appears that the Second Circuit could not get past the fact that the
plaintiffs conceded that the asserted purpose of the taking was a valid
purpose. Here, it took issue with the kind of pretext claim the plaintiffs
made: that plaintiffs conceded that the project was rationally related to
"numerous well-established public uses, but contend[ed] that it [was]
constitutionally impermissible nonetheless" because of a desire to favor the
developer, Ratner. 352 This type of pretext claim contrasts with one where
the asserted purpose is not legitimate or rational. 353 The characterization of
the plaintiffs' claim seems consistent with a mere pretext claim as found in
other cases. 35 4 Yet, the court seems not to accept the proposition that a
355
taking may have an improper purpose and yet pose conceivable benefits.
To demonstrate the taking is invalid, the court argued that the plaintiff
needed to allege "specific defect[s] in the Project that would be so
356
egregious as to render it. .. 'without reasonable foundation."'
Perhaps most important is the Goldstein court's treatment of the
plaintiffs' factual allegations in light of the factors discussed in Justice
Kennedy's concurrence. 357 The court acknowledged that the property
owners alleged that the project was undertaken at the request of Ratner
himself who was to become the private beneficiary of the takings. 358 And
while the court noted that the sequence of events was "certainly one of the
factors considered in Kelo," 359 it ignored a sequence of events which might
raise suspicion, because it found that New York State permitted such a
360
process.
A recent state court decision in the Atlantic Yards case fleshed out the
allegation the Goldstein plaintiffs made, although here, too, plaintiffs lost.
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department,
noted that the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) (which owned one of
the parcels in the Atlantic Yards site) initially avoided a competitive
bidding process, but later, after signing an agreement to cede the property to
Ratner's company, Forest City Ratner Corporation (FCRC), it issued an

351. See supra notes 18, 118 and accompanying text.
352. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 62.
353. Id. at 60-61 (explaining that the district court's analysis did not stop at an evaluation
of whether the taking was rationally related to a public use, but also included analysis of
plaintiffs' pretext claim).
354. See supra Part I.D.

355. See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
356. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 64 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241
(1984)).
357. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring)

(2005).
358. Goldstein, 516 F.3d. at 55-56.
359. Id. at 64.
360. Id.
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Request for Proposal (RFp) 36 1-arguably
an indicia of procedural
irregularity. 362 And, despite using this "'competitive' selection process, 36 3
the MTA ultimately awarded this project to FCRC anyway, receiving from
him a third of the amount that it would have received from a competitor
whose proposal did not even contemplate using eminent domain. 3 64 One
author argues that the preselection of the developer before the plan was
actually developed evinces favoritism. 36 5 Such factual allegations are
arguably enough to persuade other courts that the pretext claim should at
least survive a motion to dismiss.
Similarly narrow is the Goldstein court's reading of other pretext cases.
The court questioned whether other courts that found pretext even needed to
do so in order to invalidate the taking. 366 Indeed, in 99 Cents, the Ninth
Circuit conceded that preventing "future blight" was not a valid public
367
purpose, but the court also gave credence to pretext claims in general.
However, this was but one factor in the Ninth Circuit's holding that "the
evidence is clear beyond dispute that [the condemning authority's] efforts
rest on nothing more than the desire to achieve the naked transfer of
property from one private party to another." 368 Thus, reading 99 Cents in
light of the fact that the court found that the local government asserted no
369
valid public use is in conflict with how the Francocourt read that case.
To be sure, Goldstein leaves open the possibility for a hypothetical case
where the circumstances of the taking so severely undermine the legitimacy
of the process that the court might find pretext.
While the court
acknowledged that a case may present circumstances where the "approval
361. See In re Develop Don't Destroy (Brooklyn) v. Urban Dev. Corp., No. 104597/07,
2009 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1500, at *32-33 (Feb. 26, 2009). For a discussion of Requests
for Proposal (RFPs), see Robert C. Marshall et al., The Private Attorney General Meets
Public ContractLaw: ProcurementOversight by Protest,20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 38 (1991)
(discussing that RFPs are "usually evaluated on quality as well as cost measures"). Because
RFPs incorporate evaluation of more subjective criteria like qualitative benefits, there is
room for local governments to manipulate the review process in order to award the contract
to a favored party.
362. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (Justice Kennedy's discussion of
"elaborate procedural requirements" as a potential hint that favoritism is afoot).
363. Goldstein Cert. Petition, supra note 10, at *8.
364. Id. at *8-9.
365. Epstein, supra note 8, at 626.
366. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 62 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Tellingly, it appears that in
each of these district court cases, the plaintiff had contested whether any public use would be
served by the taking." (citing Aaron v. Target, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1175 (E.D. Mo. 2003);
Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1228
(C.D. Cal. 2002); 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp.
2d 1123,1130 (C.D. Cal. 2001))).
367. 99 Cents, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1130. Indeed, while the court did undertake an analysis
of tie purported purpose of ending future blight, id. at 1129-31, it noted that the "sole
question" before it was whether the asserted public purpose was valid or pretextual. Id. at
1129.
368. Id.
369. See Franco v. Nat'l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 172-73 (D.C. 2007)
(citing 99 Cents for the proposition that no deference to the legislature is required where the
ostensible use is pretextual).
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process so greatly undenrine[s] the basic legitimacy of the outcome
reached that a closer objective scrutiny of the justification being offered is
required," this was not such a case. 370 But ruling that it would not hear
pretext claims when a classic public purpose was asserted 37 1 may be too
narrow an interpretation of Kelo. 372 The rule either ignores the possibility
of heightened scrutiny or equates it with the more searching scrutiny under
373
Equal Protection Clause analysis.
b. Franco: Applying Substantive Weight to Pretext Claims
Several features of the Franco decision set it apart from Goldstein's more
reluctant recognition of pretext claims. While noting that courts are
constrained to defer to legislative judgments in takings, the Franco court
expressed that takings for economic development may warrant
skepticism. 374 The court did so in a case where ending blight, as in
Goldstein,375 was an asserted purpose of the taking. 376 Furthermore, like
Goldstein, the Franco court noted that Kelo's focus on deferential review
posed a subtle contradiction to applying heightened scrutiny to claims under
the Public Use Clause, but Franco demonstrates its comfort with such
judgments. 377 And finally, Franco'streatment of the factual allegations of
pretext-allegations similar to those made in Goldstein-signals that this
3 78
court was willing to ascribe more substantive weight to pretext claims.
In some regards, the Franco decision did not mark a major departure
from Goldstein, either in its requirement that property owner plead specific
factual allegations that are not merely conclusory, 379 or in its reluctance to
question legislative judgment. 380 It also reaffirmed that governments do not
38 1
have to show evidence that the taking will achieve its asserted purpose.
Despite its careful treatment of the deference standard in Kelo, the
Franco court held that "Kelo recognized that there may be situations where
a court should not take at face value what the legislature has said.

'3 82

While there is seemingly a technical agreement with Goldstein in that both
370. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63.
371. Id.
372. See Thomas, supra note 22 ("If Justice Kennedy's deciding vote and concurring

opinion in Kelo mean anything, they mean that factual allegations of pretext should be taken
seriously, and cannot be ignored simply because the record contains some evidence of public
benefit ...").
373. See Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 64 n.10.
374. Franco, 930 A.2d at 169.
375. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
376. Franco, 930 A.2d at 162.
377. See infra notes 382-84 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 357-60 and accompanying text.
379. Franco, 930 A.2d at 170.
380. Id. at 171 ("Recognizing the limited role of the courts in eminent domain
jurisprudence, we are especially careful not to indulge baseless, conclusory allegations that
the legislature acted improperly.").
381. Id. at 173 n.13.
382. Id. at 169.
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courts acknowledged that these claims may be heard in certain instances,
underpinning Franco's reasoning is a more cynical view of takings-that
legislatures should not be taken at face value because the government "will
rarely acknowledge that it is acting for a forbidden reason. ' 383 And in those
situations, the court holds, "a property owner must in some circumstances
be allowed to allege and to demonstrate that the stated public purpose for
the condemnation is pretextual. ''384 The view that courts should defer to
legislative judgments, even though this power may be abused, is a central
tension in Justice Kennedy's concurrence, one which Franco attempts to
reconcile by allowing pretext claims to be heard. 385 The Goldstein court,
on the other hand, does not address this tension, and pays more attention to
the Kelo, Berman, and Midliff trio's mandate for deference, which may be
overridden only in extreme cases where government action is alleged to be
386
egregious.
Because of its treatment of the facts alleged, the Franco court seems to
have adopted the attitude that the alleged facts do not have to be egregious,
which the Goldstein court implied is a requirement to trigger heightened
scrutiny. 3 87 By advancing "specific factual allegations" 388-even though
the court noted that the likelihood of proving those claims may be
improbable 3 89-the court found that Franco's pretext defense was sufficient
to evaluate the claim on the merits. 3 90 Indeed, some of the facts alleged in
Franco were remarkably similar to those in Goldstein.39 1 Yet, despite this
similarity, these courts came to opposing conclusions as to whether the
392
cases should proceed to discovery.
Finally, the Franco court implicitly rejected another limitation that the
Second Circuit imposed on pretext claims, mainly that when the
condemning authority asserts a classical public purpose-in both cases,
ending blight-the court may suspend its deference to legislative

383. Id.
384. Id.
385. See id.
386. See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
388. Franco, 930 A.2d at 170.
389. Id. at 172.
390. Id.
391. Both takings took place inside an integrated development plan, but those plans were
preceded by an agreement that identified the ultimate private beneficiary. Compare
Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 (2d Cir. 2008), with Franco, 930 A.2d at 170-71, 175
(finding evidence that supported the claim that the condemning authority created a Joint
Development Agreement with benefiting parties, implying that the benefiting parties were
known prior to taking). Additionally, in both cases, evidence suggested that findings of
blight were added subsequent to the initial request to confer the eminent domain powerFranco alleged they were "inserted at the last minute." Franco, 930 A.2d at 171. For a
comparison of similar facts in Goldstein, see 516 F.3d at 56.
392. Compare Franco, 930 A.2d at 175 (applying the Conley pleading standard and
granting discovery to property owners), with Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 62 (applying the
Twombly pleading standard and dismissing property owner's claim on the pleadings).
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judgment. 393 In suspending deference and scrutinizing the pretext claim,
the Franco court did not limit this analysis to takings that ended blight or
that asserted another "classical" purpose. 394 This contrasts with Goldstein's
explicit limitation of pretext analysis to cases where the purpose is
395
economic development.
Although the D.C. Court of Appeals acknowledged the possibility of a
heightened standard of review, it did not explicitly announce the standard it
would apply in reviewing pretext claims. 396 Indeed, in determining whether
the plaintiffs' claim should survive a motion to dismiss, the court only
needed to determine whether the property owner adequately pled a pretext
claim. 397 The court left us with only hints of what the standard might look
like: courts do not have to ascertain whether the taking will actually
accomplish its purpose, 398 but will determine whether "the taking will serve
an overriding public purpose and that the proposed development will
provide substantial benefits to the public." 39 9 But without a more explicit
expression, this is a matter of conjecture.
B. Possibilitiesfor Heightened Standardof Review for Pretext Claims
Although Justice Kennedy announced the possibility for a heightened
standard of review for challenges to takings alleging favoritism, he did not
explicate under what standard those claims would be reviewed, 400 nor did
the Goldstein court. 40 1 Furthermore, while the Franco court agreed to hear
the pretext claim, it did not state the standard against which the claim would

393. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
394. See Franco,930 A.2d at 167-75.
395. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 61 (arguing that because Kelo was granted certiorari on the
limited question of whether a taking is permitted solely on the basis of economic
development, "the issue of pretext must be understood in light of... the holding of the
case," which granted broad deference to legislative judgments about public use). Indeed,
Justice Kennedy wrote that a more "demanding level of scrutiny, however, is not required
simply because the purpose of the taking is economic development." Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
396. Franco,930 A.2d at 170.
397. See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (explaining the
basic requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) (pleading standard) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and survival of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)).
398. Franco,930 A.2d at 173 n.13.
399. Id. at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted). The use of the terms "overriding" and
"substantial benefits" may imply means-ends scrutiny review, which focuses on balancing of
the ends against the means. See supra note 37 (discussing that means-ends review functions
like a balancing test); see also Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests and
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence,2007 BYU L. REv. 899, 927-28 (arguing that Midkiff s
warning against "purely private taking[s]" which serve "no legitimate purpose of
government" sounds like the language of substantive due process (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth.
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984))).
400. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 492-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra notes 18283 and accompanying text.
401. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 & n.10 (2d Cir. 2008).
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be reviewed. 40 2 Without guidance from any of these cases, this section
entertains the possibility that courts face a number of choices should they
apply heightened scrutiny to pretext claims. This section examines three
possibilities for a heightened standard of review: strict scrutiny review,
means-ends scrutiny, and a tripartite burden-shifting standard. 403 The next
section, Part II.C, examines a fourth possibility for heightened scrutiny,
process scrutiny.
1. Option One: Apply Strict Scrutiny Review
In the aftermath of Kelo, some have called for courts to apply strict
scrutiny to takings. 40 4 Under strict scrutiny analysis, a law will be upheld if
it is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose and if it is
narrowly tailored to achieve this end. 40 5 When courts apply strict scrutiny,
the burden is on the government to demonstrate that a "truly vital interest is
served by the law in question," and that it could not attain this goal
"through any means less restrictive of the right. '40 6 Courts apply strict
scrutiny analysis-an exacting standard
of review which has been noted 4as
4 7
08
"strict in theory" but "fatal in fact"

-to

certain fundamental rights.

This argument could find legitimacy in the Kelo majority's reference to
Calder v. Bull's 409 warning that a private taking "is against all reason and
justice, '4 10 language which one author notes "sounds in substantive due
4
process." 11
However, such an argument bases its call for strict scrutiny on criticism
of Kelo itself,not on the argument that Justice Kennedy's pretext discussion
created a new standard of review for a specific challenge to eminent
domain. 4 12 Also, recognizing private property rights as a fundamental right

402. See Franco, 930 A.2d at 173 ("We conclude that a reviewing court must focus

primarily on benefits the public hopes to realize from the proposed taking.").
403. See supra note 37 for a description of the nomenclature of this type of judicial test.
404. Justin Morgan Crane, Note, The Privatizationof Public Use: Why Rational Basis
Review of a PrivateProperty Condemnation Is a Violation of a FundamentalCivil Right, 28
WHIrER L.REv. 511, 512, 527-28 (2006) (finding that private property rights should be
construed as a fundamental right and thus heightened scrutiny should apply, rather than
calling for heightened scrutiny based on Kelo's discussion of pretext).
405. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986) (holding that public
employer's layoff policy enacted to redress past racial discrimination failed strict scrutiny
analysis as it was not narrowly tailored enough to promote a compelling government

interest).
406. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 797.

407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

See Fallon, supra note 37, at 79.
See Eagle, supra note 399, at 951.
3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798).
Id. at 927-28 (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. at 388).
Id. at 928.

412. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 404, at 527-28 (finding that private property rights

should be construed as a fundamental right and thus heightened scrutiny should apply).
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fails to comport with Kelo's central holding, which itself
is a rejection of
4 13
the argument that takings should receive strict scrutiny.
2. Option Two: Apply Means-Ends Review
In discussing review for future claims of impermissible favoritism,
Justice Kennedy used the term "heightened scrutiny"-a term which others
4 14
have found to refer to intermediate-level or means-ends scrutiny.
4 15
Support for applying such a form of means-ends or heightened scrutiny
is found in another takings context where the Court applied less deferential
4 17
review of government acts. 4 16 Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission
and Dolan 4v.19 City of Tigard4 18 comprise a subset of takings claims called
"exaction."
Taken together, the Nollan-Dolan line of cases demands that
a regulation is a taking "if either the government regulation is not rationally
connected to the government's reason for regulating or the burden imposed

413. See supra notes 40-54 (discussing Kelo as upholding rational basis review of takings
for economic development).
414. See Eagle, supra note 399, at 951-52 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
415. Heightened scrutiny in the takings context is an outgrowth of the seminal case
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, where Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes explained that it is
the duty of the Court in land use regulations to determine whether a governing body has
"[gone] too far." 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (invalidating a statute that interfered with mining
company's contractual rights to engage in subsurface mining); see Fenster, supra note 61,
680-81 (discussing the doctrine of applying heightened scrutiny to claims involving
regulatory takings). However, Professor Mark Fenster is careful to note that courts do not
evaluate all takings against this standard, and that Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528
(2005), was a terminal point on this trajectory in that the Court did not apply heightened
scrutiny in that case. Id. at 681.
416. See Stark, supra note 164, at 630-35 (discussing applying a standard akin to that in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374 (1994), to analysis of takings involving a heightened risk of abuse).
417. 483 U.S. 825, 837, 841-42 (holding that a town conditioning the grant of a building
permit in exchange for property owners granting the city an easement across their property
constituted a taking where there was no essential nexus between the permit condition and the
asserted public purpose).
418. 512 U.S. 374, 391, 395 (holding that city's conditioning issuance of a property
owner's building permit on dedication of land for construction of a greenway was not
roughly proportionate to the justification for the regulation).
419. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission developed the first prong of what became
a two-prong test. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 653. There, a court determines whether
there is an "essential nexus" between the purpose of the government regulation and the
condition exacted: "unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as
the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an outand-out plan of extortion."' Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs, Inc. v.
Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981)). Later, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court
added an additional "rough proportionality" component to the Nollan test. Dolan, 512 U.S.
at 391. The Court explained that courts must make an "individualized determination that the
required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development." Id. In contrast to rational basis review, "rough proportionality" asks more
than just whether there is any reasonable explanation for the regulation, but whether burdens
imposed by the regulation outweigh the benefits gained. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at
654.
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by the condition is not roughly proportionate to the benefits gained because
of the condition. ' 420 Professor Debra Pogrund Stark explains that Nollan
and Dolan apply to determining whether a regulation is a taking, not-as is
the case with pretext claims-whether a taking is constitutional. 42' Yet, she
nevertheless finds the Nollan-Dolan test a model for a heightened standard
of review in pretext cases: "The Nollan and Dolan cases provide recent
Supreme Court precedent for courts to more closely scrutinize
governmental actions affecting private property when the governmental
action is taken in a context where there is a heightened risk of abuse. ' 422
Stark argues that, based on this precedent for heightened scrutiny, the
burden should be on the government to prove that the taking is "'necessary'
and that there are no other reasonable alternative ways to achieve the
indirect pub[l]ic benefit, '423 that it is "'likely to occur,"'' 4 24 and that there is
an important government interest, which is "measured by whether there is a
'net social benefit' from the taking. '4 25
However, the Supreme Court warned of limiting this method of review to
cases where a governing body is seeking an exaction from a property
owner.4 26 Recently, in MHC FinancingLtd. Partnership v. City of San
Rafael, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied
the city summary judgment as there was a triable issue on the pretext
claim.427 There, the court resisted characterizing every regulation as an
exaction, because to do so would flatly ignore the Court's decision in Lingle
v. Chevron USA, Inc. 42 8 and "upend" takings law.429 Also, the Ninth
Circuit has argued that means-ends scrutiny is the wrong lens for Public
Use claims, and distinguishes between claims involving regulatory takings
and those challenging the asserted public use. 430 The Ninth Circuit held
that, because of this difference, Nollan-Dolan is inapposite. 4 31 In
Richardson v. City of Honolulu,432 the Ninth Circuit concluded that "those
420. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 654.

421. Stark, supra note 164, at 634.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 640.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 642.
426. See MHC Fin. Ltd. P'ship v. City of San Rafael, No. 00-3785, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89195, *43-44 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, 526 U.S. 687 (1999)). The MHC Financing Ltd. Partnershipv. City of San
Raphael court rejects the application of the substantial nexus test outside of the exaction
context because doing so would "upend[] takings law." Id. at *43.
427. Id.
428. 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (holding that the government was not required to prove
that a statute intended to control retail gas prices substantially advanced a legitimate state
interest).
429. MHC Fin., at *43-44 (citing Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 702).
430. Richardson v. City of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that a city ordinance that converted leasehold interests of condominium units into fee
interests was constitutional and did not violate either the Due Process or Equal Protection
Clauses).
431. Id. at 1158.
432. 124 F.3d 1150.

2009]

BRINGING PRETEXT CLAIMS AFTER KELO

3145

cases are not applicable because they involved uncompensated regulatory
takings, in which the issues are quite different. '433
What remains to be seen is whether a version of heightened scrutiny,
formed similarly to Nollan and Dolan could be applicable to pretext claims.
Indeed, there are pretext cases where courts use language similar to or
approaching that of Nollan and Dolan's rough proportionality requirement
that the benefits outweigh the burden. 434 The Seventh Circuit has arguably
approximated this standard in Daniels v. Area Plan Commission,435 where
the court held that a taking violated the Public Use Clause because the
condemning authority did not supply facts that demonstrated the taking was
"substantially related to a public interest. '4 36 Similarly, in Franco,the D.C.
Court of Appeals used similar terminology, perhaps suggesting that it was
43 7
applying a standard of scrutiny similar to the means-ends analysis.
Franco's suggestion that heightened scrutiny for pretext claim is similar
to heightened scrutiny under Nollan-Dolan, is an idea that has yet to gain
traction in the courts. This next section analyzes an argument by Professor
Kelly who suggests an alternative standard for heightened scrutiny, one that
focuses on the risk of favoritism.
3. Option Three: Kelly's Tripartite Burden-Shifting Framework
A third alternative is to subject pretext claims to an analysis that
examines the type of proposed condemnation-whether it is a blighted area,
redevelopment district, new assembly, or whether it is a one-to-one transfer
of land4 38-in determining whether it poses a heightened risk of favoritism.
This analysis of risk of favoritism derives from Professor Kelly's
framework for dividing potential private involvement in eminent domain
into pre- and postcondemnation stages. 4 39 Kelly hypothesizes that such an
analysis provides a "coherent doctrinal framework" that is capable of
navigating a course between the twin evils of too much judicial discretion,
440
on one hand, and too much deference on the other.
Kelly applies this framework of temporal private involvement to a
variety of classes of takings to provide courts with a sense of when private

433. Id. at 1157.
434. See supra note 399.
435. 306 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2002).

436. Id. at 465-66 (holding that vacation of a restrictive covenant for the purpose of
development amounted to a private taking because the developer was the primary
beneficiary of the vacation).
437. See Franco v. Nat'l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 174 (D.C. 2007)
(using the terms "overriding public purpose" and "substantial benefits to the public"); see
also supra note 399.
438. Kelly, supra note 77, at 38.

439. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
440. Kelly, supra note 77, at 48.
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involvement is or is not necessary. 44 1 For example, in a situation where the
condemnation is directed at ending blight or creating a redevelopment
district, Kelly argues that precondemnation private involvement is usually
unnecessary because governments are capable of identifying such needs
without the assistance of private involvement. 44 2 He explains that courts
should be suspicious of precondemnation private involvement in such
scenarios where it is unnecessary. 44 3 However, he argues that proving risk
of favoritism is not enough; rather, through a tripartite burden-shifting
standard, governments can rebut this presumption of invalidity by
demonstrating a specific and valid purpose, shifting the burden back to the
property owner to demonstrate that the taking was an act of favoritism. 444
On this third step, Kelly postulates that property owners may prevail by
proving the pre- or postcondemnation involvement of a preferred private
party was unnecessary, which they prove by demonstrating that the private
party was not selected through a competitive process. 445 Ultimately, the
test Kelly proposes does not purport to help courts determine whether the
taking is actually pretextual; under Kelly's analysis, a court does not find ill
motive but risk of ill motive.
Kelly explains that the alternatives to his test-either a test based on the
factors discussed in Justice Kennedy's Kelo concurrence 44 6 or a test based

on intentn4 7-are not up to the task of preventing pretextual takings. 44 8
First, he attacks the "current test based on Kelo," 449 which he explains is a
test based on the Kennedy factors-magnitude of benefits, extensiveness of
planning and process, and identification of private parties--on a variety of
grounds. 450 He criticizes examining the extent of planning and process for
its futility, because local officials may simply reconstitute the project in a
way that will escape scrutiny; 4 51 he rejects analysis of the magnitude of
benefits as inadministrable 452 and "vacuous" because it is difficult to
441. Id. at 36-47. These classes include (1) blighted areas, (2) redevelopment districts,
(3) new assemblies, (4) positive externalities, (5) changed circumstances, (6) one-to-one
transfers, and (7) "same-use" takings. Id.
442. Compare id. at 38 (describing precondemnation private involvement as unnecessary
because "blight factors are usually observable"), with id. at 40 (explaining that governments
do not need to rely on private involvement in assembling a redevelopment district because
such districts usually contain deteriorating parcels which are "typically observable").
443. Id. at 38, 40.
444. Id. at 32-36 (proposing application of a tripartite burden-shifting analysis which is
based on a similar standard used in Title VII discrimination cases).
445. Id. at 36; see e.g., id. at 39 (risk of pretext where no competitive bidding and
asserted purpose is ending blight); id. at 40 (risk of pretext where no competitive process and
asserted purpose is redevelopment).
446. Id. at9-17.
447. Id. at 18-20.
448. See, e.g., id. at 9 (a test based on the magnitude of benefits is inadministrable); id. at
15-16 (examination of procedural regularity is "futile"); id. at 20 (a test based on intent is
marked by inadministrability, futility, and disutility).
449. See id. at 9.
450. See id. at 9-17.
451. Id. at 15-16.
452. Id. at 12.
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predict the benefits of a project, 45 3 and potentially violative of Kelo's
454
caution against courts evaluating the wisdom of takings.
Next, Kelly assails an intent-based test, which he asserts is a different test
from the Kennedy factors test. Kelly's rendition of motive analysis
explains that he understands the test to be analytically different and separate
from a test based on Kennedy's factors. 455 For Kelly, the problem of mixed
motived is the biggest flaw in motive analysis. 456 The possibility that a
condemning authority might have mixed motives-that it might respond to
relocation threat with an intended benefit to a private party, but does so
because it intends to keep that private party in the locality so that it
continues to benefit the community-saddles the judiciary with the
45 7
impossible problem of unpacking a paradox.
Ultimately, at the center of Kelly's proposal is using the presence or
absence of competitive bidding to assess the risk of favoritism. Kelly
explains that if a government wants to favor a particular party, competitive
bidding will ruin that scheme because competitive bidding forces
governments to select the highest bidder. 458 He explains that this analysis
works in the context of a taking in a blighted area 459 or in a redevelopment
district. 460 However, he implies that it would not be a determinative factor
in all cases. For instance, in a situation where the taking results in a one-toone transfer of property-as in a case like Southwestern Illinois
Development Authority v. National City Environmental, LLC,4 61 or 99
Cents, 4 6 2 a property owner may prevail in step three of a tripartite burden463
shifting test by demonstrating that there were alternatives to the taking.
Kelly does look to other factors that could prove pretext on step three of
his test. He imports examination of economic benefits to another type of
taking-"'same use' takings," which is when, for instance, a private golf
course is taken and converted into a public golf course. 464 Kelly suggests
that the "economic benefits"-similar to magnitude of benefits, although
Kelly does not import that term to this takings context-may be a factor in
46 5
finding pretext.
And yet, despite offering methods for proving pretext in these four
contexts, Kelly does not explain how property owners might prevail under a
453. Id. at 11.
454. Id. at 11-12.
455. See, e.g., id. at 18 (referring to a test that focuses "on the intent of the condemnor" as
an alternative to the "current framework" [the Kennedy factors]).
456. Id.
457. See id. at 19.
458. See id. at 28-29.
459. Id. at 38-39.
460. Id. at 40.
461. 768 N.E.2d 1 (111. 2002)
462. 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
463. Kelly, supra note 77, at 45; see also supra Part I.D.2.b (discussing the availability of
alternatives as a factor in assessing pretext).
464. See Kelly, supra note 77, at 46.
465. See id. at 47.
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tripartite burden-shifting standard where the taking fits the profile of a new
assembly, positive externality, or changed circumstances (where the
4 66
original reason for the taking is changed after the condemnation).
Interestingly, Kelly argues that Kelo fits the profile of a positive
externality, 467 which arises when potentially favored "private parties...
obtain spillovers from the project," but are not the direct beneficiaries of the
46 9
taking. 468 With regard to the additional facts discovered post-Kelo,
Kelly suggests "that pretext is a distinct possibility even when a private
developer is not the private party being favored," but he ultimately avoids
any conclusions on this issue, by failing to identify how a property owner
might prevail under his framework. 4 70 Given the centrality of competitive
bidding to his test, it is unclear whether the fact that New London opposed a
competitive process 4 71 would militate for finding pretext in Kelo.
The next section examines a test which combines what Kelly criticizesan intent based test and a test based on the Kennedy factors-and serves as
a potential way of assessing pretext claims in a larger variety of takings.
Unlike the above tests, this test is grounded in pretext case law.
C. An Alternative for Applying Heightened Scrutiny: Process Scrutiny
Some scholars have interpreted Kelo's reference to pretext as a call for
judicial analysis of motive.4 72 Precedent for motive analysis may be found
elsewhere in constitutional jurisprudence, and thus would certainly not be
anything new. 473 For example, in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,474 where the Court held that
courts may examine legislative motivation in determining whether a law is
discriminatory. 4 75 Professor Young argues that the list of contexts in which
466. See id. at 40-44 (discussing new assemblies, positive externalities, changed
circumstances, but failing to explain factors courts might use to find pretext).
467. Id. at 42-43.
468. Id. at 41.
469. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
470. Kelly, supra note 77, at 43.
471. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
472. See generally Cohen, supra note 54. As this next section explains, Professor Charles
E. Cohen terms his version of motive analysis in the eminent domain context a "process
scrutiny" standard. See infra Part.II.C. 1.
473. See Fallon, supra note 37, at 71. Richard Fallon's work situates purpose inquiry in a
broad discussion of constitutional doctrine and the numerous types of tests that the Court
applies. He argues that in the past twenty-five years, the Court has been in the business of
applying a test that determines whether the government has acted with an illicit motive,
finding this type of analysis in Dormant Commerce Clause, Equal Protection Clause,
Establishment Clause, Free Expression Clause, and Substantive Due Process jurisprudence.
Id. at 90-94.
474. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
475. Id. at 266 (explaining that courts may evaluate circumstantial evidence in assessing
whether a city's refusal to rezone a parcel of land to allow for moderate- and low-income
housing masked a racially discriminatory purpose). There the Court announced several
factors relevant to evaluating a discriminatory purpose: (1) "The historical background of
the decision," id. at 267; (2) "specific sequence of events leading up to the [act]," id.; (3)
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the court conducts motive analysis is expansive: "[M]otive analysis is a
pervasive feature of equal protection law, of substantive due process,
including the First Amendment's protections for speech, and even of
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis." 4 76 This section examines motive
analysis for pretext claims under the47Public
Use Clause in the form of what
7
one author terms "process scrutiny."
1. Motive Analysis Through a "Process Scrutiny" Standard
A third option for heightened scrutiny is to scrutinize the process leading
up to the condemnation to determine if the asserted purpose is pretextual.
478
Professor Charles Cohen coined such analysis "process scrutiny,"
although other authors have labeled the type of analysis for which Cohen
calls either motive or purpose analysis. 4 79 Process scrutiny, an alternative
to means-ends and strict scrutiny, shifts the focus from rational basis
review's consideration of whether there is a conceivable purpose to
evaluating the validity of the condemnation process itself.4 80 Some have
argued that this test is implied from the importance Kelo attached to the fact
'48 1
that the taking occurred inside the presence of a "comprehensive plan.
If Kelo did in fact announce a new process scrutiny rule, it would mark a
482
major shift in public use jurisprudence.
Process scrutiny, as opposed to means-ends, strict scrutiny, or rational
basis review is analytically a different test. On one hand, the latter, "ends"focused standards of review ask whether the asserted purpose is legitimate,
both under federal and state constitutional law.483 Then, using various
departure from normal procedure, id. at 267; and (4) analysis of legislative or administrative
history, id. at 268.
476. Young, supra note 112, at 193.
477. Cohen, supra note 54, at 411-19.
478. See generally id. at 411.
479. Another author, Bernard Bell, discusses this inquiry as analysis of motive, arguing
that it stems from a type of standard of scrutiny traditionally recognized by the Court. Bell,
supra note 80, at 187. Although Bell uses the term "motive" and not "purpose," he cites to
Fallon, who writes extensively on this topic calling the test a "purpose inquiry." See, e.g.,
Fallon, supra note 37, at 71 ("[Under purpose inquiry] legislation or other governmental
policies are invalid if developed or applied for constitutionally illegitimate reasons.").
Substantively, the inquiry in a "motive" test and a "process" test vary little, and in fact are
essentially the same, although Cohen's "process scrutiny," with its focus on comprehensive
planning, see, e.g., Cohen, supra note 54, at 418-19 (discussing a 'comprehensive plan"'
rule in the context of a discussion of "process scrutiny" (quoting Clayton P. Gillette, Kelo
and the Local PoliticalProcess, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 13, 18 (2005))), may be understood as
a more specific version of Bell's and Fallon's inquiry into purpose or motive. This Note
uses the term "process scrutiny" to refer to these related types of review.
480. Cohen, supra note 54, at 378.
481. See generally id.; see also infra notes 520-25 and accompanying text (critiquing
Cohen's analysis of the presence of a comprehensive plan).
482. Cohen, supra note 54, at 411. However, as Fallon notes, the Court engages in
purpose inquiry in a variety of areas, including review under the Dormant Commerce
Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Establishment Clause, as well as review of statutes
that discriminate on the basis of race. Fallon, supra note 37, 90-102.
483. Cohen, supra note 54, at 416; see also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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levels of scrutiny-depending on the test-the court determines whether the
asserted purpose is rationally related to the means of accomplishing it
(rational basis review) or, as is the case with strict scrutiny, and to some
extent means-ends scrutiny, whether the ends justify the means. 484 Under
these types of review "the actual purpose behind the government's action is
485
irrelevant, as long as there could be a legitimate purpose."
Process scrutiny, on the other hand, as an inquiry into the actual purpose,
neither inquires into the rationality of the method of taking property to
achieve a certain end nor balances the benefits against the burdens imposed;
rather, this test seeks to confirm the veracity of what the legislature says it
is trying to do.4 86 It is guided by the principle that "legislation or other
governmental policies are invalid if developed or applied for
constitutionally illegitimate reasons. ' 48 7 By applying process scrutiny, a
court finds pretext by analyzing indicators which call into question the
integrity of the legislative process that produced the decision to condemn
4 88
the property.
This type of scrutiny, applied to pretext claims evinces a straightforward
rule: "a proposed taking may be struck down as lacking a justifying 'public
use' even ifthe project for which the targeted land is intended will, or
conceivably could, produce a public benefit. '489 In effect, the process
approach "flush[es] out uses of the eminent domain power motivated by an
improper desire to benefit private interests." 4 90 Professor Richard Fallon's
analysis of purpose inquiry-a similar standard to Cohen's-would add to
this rule an implicit second prong that addresses causation: once it is
determined that the actual purposes are forbidden, "the question is whether,
but for the influence of some illegitimate consideration in motivating one or
more relevant decision-makers, the government would likely have enacted a
challenged statute or taken other contested steps. '49 1 Taken together and
applied to pretext claims, these tests purport to restore protection to
Adopting a process scrutiny
underenforced constitutional rights.4 92

484. Cohen, supra note 54, at 416.
485. Id.

486. Id. at 411 ("[F]or the first time, the Supreme Court has hinted that the inquiry is not
to be focused on the proposed end use of a property, but whether the political process has
fallen victim to the very dangers that the Fifth Amendment public use clause was intended to
prevent.").
487. Fallon, supra note 37, at 71.
488. See infra note 505 and accompanying text.

489. Cohen, supra note 54, at 415 (citing Garnett, supra note 83, at 457-58).
490. Id. at 378.
491. Fallon, supra note 37, at 72 (citing Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose:
The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413,

431, 439 (1996)); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 270 n.21 (1977) (citing Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)) (noting
that after proving discriminatory purpose the burden would then shift to the government to
prove that "the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not
been considered").
492. See infra 514-17 and accompanying text.
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standard could answer the criticism that Kelo emasculates the Fifth
4 93
Amendment.
2. Process Scrutiny Applied
A process scrutiny approach is not without precedent in state-and in

cases like 99 Cents, 494 Aaron,495 and Armendariz,496 federal-court. 497 In

bolstering this view, Cohen draws on four cases, Southwestern Illinois
Development Authority,49 8 99 Cents,499 Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown
Development Authority,50 0 and Wilmington Parking Authority v. Land with
Improvements, 50 1 where he finds the courts applied a version of process
scrutiny in reaching a conclusion that the taking was pretextual. 50 2 In each
case Cohen cites, the court concluded the taking was pretextual based on a
variety of factors5 0 3 ; in none of these cases is there a mea culpa by a
deceiving legislator (although there may be written or spoken statements to
that effect), 50 4 but an amalgamation of what Cohen calls "the stench of
procedural irregularities or indicia of improper influence." 50 5 Grouping
together under a single standard cases that examined a variety of factors in
inferring pretext, this test contrasts with Kelly's rendition of motive
analysis, which he distinguishes from a test that uses the Kennedy
factors.50 6 The process scrutiny approach subsumes the Kennedy factors
into a motive test; thus, unlike Kelly's characterization, they are not two
tests, but one, and thus, analytically, one serves the other.
493. Cohen explains that while the public use requirement "is underenforced by federal
courts because of the Supreme Court's well-entrenched reluctance to evaluate
socioeconomic legislation and the difficulty of formulating a workable public use test" it is
possible that the requirement of "a 'comprehensive development plan' might help
distinguish permissible from impermissible takings" and "embod[y] an invitation to fully
enforce the public use clause." Cohen, supra note 54, at 410. But see Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469, 502-03 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing a motive test as
an insufficient constitutional protection).
494. See supra note 216.
495. See supra note 108.
496. 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996).
497. Id. at 412 ("Scrutiny of the process as opposed to the result, while not common, is
not unprecedented in the state courts.").
498. 768 N.E.2d 1 (111. 2002).
499. See supra note 216.
500. 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975).
501. 521 A.2d 227 (Del. 1986).
502. Cohen, supra note 54, at 412-15.
503. In discussing Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City
Environmental, LLC for example, Cohen points to a variety of factors the Illinois Supreme
Court found illustrative of pretext: (1) the public was not the primary beneficiary because
the condemning authority did not commission a study, (2) it did not develop an economic
plan which would be required to be put into effect, (3) it advertised that it would condemn
land for "'private developers' for their "'private use"' for a fee, and (4) it made known that
it would condemn whatever the private beneficiary in this case wanted. Id. at 412-13
(discussing Southwestern Illinois Development Authority, 768 N.E.2d at 10).
504. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
505. Cohen, supra note 54, at 411.
506. See supra note 455 and accompanying text.
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3. Criticism of and Justification for a Process Scrutiny Standard
Despite these advantages, process scrutiny entails certain costs. Among
its limitations may be that it is costly to conduct, it produces evidentiary
50 7
problems, and it can be insulting to other branches of government.
Justice O'Connor, in her Kelo dissent, questioned the logic of such a test,
arguing that if a taking results in a private-to-private transfer of property, it
should not matter what the legislature intended to achieve. 508 Others
question the efficacy of such a rule: Professor Bernard Bell questions the
strength of this test altogether, calling it "anemic. ' 50 9 Additionally, Kelly's
criticism of motive analysis for its potential for disutility, 5 10 futility,5 11 and
judicial inadministrability 5 12 would likely be extended to Cohen's test.
Even Cohen, who argues that Kelo introduced this new rule, questions
5 13
whether it will stem abuse of eminent domain.
Nevertheless, scrutiny of legislative purpose and process restores trust in
the legislative branch's power to declare eminent domain and ensures
fairness in takings, as well as moral accountability. The rationale behind
scrutiny of purpose and process is that the underenforcement of
constitutional protections 5 14 rests on trust of other branches, which upends a
507. Fallon, supra note 37, at 98; see also Regan, supra note 7, at 1285 (noting that the
Court engages in motive analysis although it is loath to do it, because the Justices "feel some
disinclination to accuse state officials of improper purpose").
508. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 502-03 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing a "purpose test" in favor of an outright ban on takings for economic
development). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote,
Even if there were a practical way to isolate the motives behind a given taking,
the gesture toward a purpose test is theoretically flawed. If it is true that incidental
public benefits from new private use are enough to ensure the 'public purpose' in a
taking, why should it matter, as far as the Fifth Amendment is concerned, what
inspired the taking in the first place? How much the government does or does not
desire to benefit a favored private party has no bearing on whether an economic
development taking will or will not generate secondary benefit for the public. And
whatever the reason for a given condemnation, the effect is the same from the
constitutional perspective-private property is forcibly relinquished to new private
ownership.
Id.
509. See Bell, supra note 80, at 187 ("[M]otive tests, such as that adopted by the majority,
have often proven anemic and provided citizens with illusory protection against government
officials at best.").
510. Kelly, supra note 77, at 7 ("Evaluating whether a certain use of eminent domain is
pretextual means that a taking might be invalidated [on the basis of motivation] even though
a forced transfer would have increased social welfare.").
511. Id. at 8 ("[E]ven if the [condemning] officials reveal their true motivation, the
condemnees seek injunctive relief, and the court holds that the asserted purpose is pretextual,
the [condemning authority] could simply approve the same condemnation without revealing
the taking's actual purpose."). This criticism is akin to the "stupid staffer" problem. See
supra note 190 and accompanying text.
512. Id. at 8 ("[E]ven in the event that a [condemning authority] declares her motivation,
it is nearly impossible to know whether that member's motivation is representative of the
other members.").
513. Cohen, supra note 54, at 379, 418.
514. Seeid. at410.
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claim of illicit purpose. 515 Thus, claims of illicit purpose ensure that
underenforced constitutional provisions are not trampled, maintaining the
integrity of a system where the judiciary defers to legislative judgments. A
process test provides an institutional check on legislatures in defense of
constitutional rights, ensuring that landowners will have a meaningful
chance to be heard. 5 16 Cohen argues that this constitutes a "representation
reinforcement model" whereby courts, which are unable to "promulgate a
precise rule for resolution of a constitutional question" leave it to the
political process on the front end to decide the issue, but then kick in on the
'5 17
back end, "scrutiniz[ing] the process to make sure that it operates fairly.
Motive analysis is justified in moral terms, that it attempts to correct
"deontological
wrongness-illegitimate
motives
as
wrong
in
themselves," 5 18 but also seeks more concrete, consequentialist aims like
preventing the psychic harm caused to victims of the improperly motivated
5 19
act.
However, Cohen's articulation of process scrutiny comes with a potential
limitation. In labeling the process scrutiny rule a "comprehensive plan
test"-a confusing aspect of his analysis because he uses this term
interchangeably with "process scrutiny" 52 0-he notes the possibility that
legislators will use the presence of a comprehensive plan as a safe
harbor. 521
Dodging scrutiny by creating a comprehensive plan and
complying with procedure would indeed speak directly to the "'stupid
5 22
staffer"' problem to which Justice O'Connor referred in her Kelo dissent.
Using the presence of a comprehensive plan as a safe harbor, local officials
may mask the fact that they have engineered a comprehensive plan that is
intended to appear as if it emerged from an open process. 523 Indeed, on this
515.
516.
517.
518.

Fallon, supra note 37, at 94-95.
Cohen, supra note 54, at 418-19.
Id. at 375.
Young, supra note 112, at 196-97.

519. Id. at 253.
520. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 54, at 411-19. In addition to calling the rule in Kelo a
process scrutiny, and even an "improperly motivated taking test," id. at 417, Cohen calls the
new rule coming out of Kelo a "comprehensive plan test," id. at 411-19. Under a
"comprehensive plan test" a taking will not be considered suspicious "if undertaken pursuant

to some degree of 'comprehensive' planning," but in the absence of a comprehensive plan,
may be considered suspicious and cause a court to depart from rational basis review. Id. at
385-86. Presumably, Cohen means that presence of a comprehensive plan is a conclusion
that courts draw after considering "whether the government actually evaluated the likelihood
of success, considered alternatives, and even commissioned independent studies." Id. at 417.
However, it is unclear from Cohen's discussion whether presence of a comprehensive plan is

a conclusion that courts draw after they scrutinize the process, i.e., a conclusion about the
adequacy of the process and thus a positive verdict on whether or not a taking triggers
suspicion. An alternative possibility is that presence of what appears to be a comprehensive
plan will prevent a court from presuming the taking is suspicious-and thus means it is
deserving of rational basis review-unless property owners make a claim that might raise
suspicion. See infra Part III.A.
521. Cohen, supra note 54, at 416.
522. See supra notes 190, 508 and accompanying text.
523. Cohen, supra note 54, at 418.
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point Cohen explains that the protections process scrutiny offers stop short
of addressing structural problems with local representation. 524 The check
on illegitimate takings that public hearings are supposed to provide may fail
52 5
when public officials hold those hearings just to go through the motions.
The next part includes a discussion of several problems with Cohen's
formulation of a comprehensive plan test. First, it is unclear how a court
would actually apply a "comprehensive plan" test. 526 Additionally, by
attaching such import to the presence of a "comprehensive plan," Cohen
potentially construes Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Kelo in a way that
might constrain courts from examining a wide range of factors in a search
for pretext. 527 What is clear from the above discussion is that courts, like
the D.C. Court of Appeals in Franco,which wish to give substantive weight
to Justice Kennedy's concurrence, have available a body of case law on
which to draw. In doing so they may either add to or flesh out the factors
Justice Kennedy discusses.
III. PROCESS SCRUTINY: USING THE KENNEDY FACTORS TO INFER
MOTIVE

It is clear that Justice Kennedy's fifth vote concurrence in Kelo, and to
some extent Justice Stevens's reference to pretext, gave indication that the
Court is willing to embrace a new rule that scrutinizes takings to determine
whether the asserted purpose is pretextual. 528 The point of Justice
Kennedy's discussion of pretext was that Kelo was not a pretextual
taking, 529 but that other cases might be, and that these claims, which are
hard to ferret out, require a more searching standard of review. 530 This new
standard, hinted at by Justice Kennedy, is thus more stringent than the
deferential standard of review that the Kelo majority endorsed. 531 The
seeming tension between deference and scrutiny is perfectly reconcilable:
the Court applies rational basis review to determine what constitutes a valid
public use under the Fifth Amendment, and it applies a more stringent
standard to determine whether the asserted purpose is the legislature's
actual purpose. 532 The logic of Kelo, that legislatures are better than courts
533
in determining what constitutes a legitimate public purpose, still stands.
524. Id. at 419 (explaining that a "comprehensive plan" test would not eliminate the risk
of political capture of local public officials).
525. Id. at 418.
526. Cohen argues that scrutiny of a comprehensive plan may not necessarily mean that
the Court will examine the "quality of the planning process," but may just evaluate the
presence of a comprehensive plan. Id. at 418; see supra note 520 and accompanying text.
527. See supra Part I.D.2.
528. See supra Part I.C (discussing the pretext standard announced in Kelo); see also Part
II.A.2.b (discussing the Francocourt's subscription to a new pretext standard).
529. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
530. See supra Part I.C.2, D.2 (discussing the Kennedy pretext factors and application of
those factors in case law).
531. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
532. See, e.g., Parts I.D. .a, II.A.2.b.

533. See supra notes 382-85 and accompanying text.
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But pretext claims second-guess legislatures precisely where the courts
should, challenging legislatures to demonstrate that they did not abuse their
power in declaring eminent domain for a favored party.
A. ProcessScrutiny, A New Standard
1. Rejecting the Alternatives
Justice Kennedy's call for a heightened standard of review for cases of
undetected impermissible favoritism should be interpreted as a call for
heightened judicial scrutiny of a legislature's purpose in taking private
property. Process scrutiny is a heightened standard in the sense that courts
should look beyond just satisfying providing a rational basis for the taking;
when property owners plead sufficient facts supporting a pretext theory,
courts should conduct an extensive factual inquiry-as the Connecticut
state courts were purported to have done in Kelo 534-into a variety of
factors in order to ascertain the veracity of the government's asserted
purpose. Pretext review is more stringent than rational basis review
because, in evaluating these claims, courts will not just look for any
conceivable purpose offered by the legislature, but at the legislature's real
535
purpose.
It is fairly clear that a heightened standard of review is not one, like the
standard in the Nollan-Dolan line of cases, which searches for a nexus
between purported benefits the government seeks and burdens born by the
aggrieved property owner. 536 Lingle, decided the same year as Kelo,
forbids applying Nollan-Dolan outside of the regulatory takings context. 537
True, Lingle may be limited to assessing what constitutes a taking and may
not apply to the Public Use Clause, but the logic of the Ninth Circuit is
sound: it is analytically the wrong test. 5 38 If the government action is
based on impermissible favoritism, and thus a violation of the cardinal rule
set out in Calder,539 any amount of property taken is too much. 540
Furthermore, a means-ends test is analytically inadequate to achieve what
pretext claims ask, which is not a weighing of burdens against benefits, but
54 1
a confirmation of purpose.
Additionally, applying strict scrutiny would be a direct contradiction of
the central holding of Kelo, which is that courts should defer to legislatures
in determining what legitimate state purposes warrant impinging on
constitutional rights. 542 But even if courts applied strict scrutiny, as long as
534. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
535. See supra notes 486-88 and accompanying text.
536. See supra notes 420-33 and accompanying text.

537. See supra notes 428-29 and accompanying text.
538. See supra notes 430-33 and accompanying text.
539.
540.
541.
542.

See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
See supra note 486 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
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the taking advanced a compelling government interest and was narrowly
tailored,54 3 the taking might still be impervious to claims that its true
purpose was favoritism. These "ends" focused modes of analysis add little,
if anything, to correcting takings motivated by favoritism.
A third alternative-an assessment of risk of favoritism through a
tripartite burden-shifting analysis 5 44-also suffers a number of flaws and is
not preferable to process scrutiny analysis. First, in making competitive
bidding the prime method of establishing pretext under the third step of
burden shifting, 545 Kelly veers on making competitive bidding the panacea
to favoritism. But as Goldstein shows, competitive bidding may not
necessarily cleanse the taking of favoritism. 546 There, the state-run MTA,
conducted a RFP, and did not require that the highest bidder win.
Competitive process analysis does little to guarantee absence of favoritism
if the competitive process allows for potential manipulation. 547 Thus in a
situation like Goldstein, where the winning bid was not determined by
price, but by other qualitative factors, governments have a lot more
flexibility to hide their reason for not going with the highest bid.
Perhaps RFPs do not meet the rigorous standards that Kelly proposes,
and Kelly has in mind a process that requires awarding contracts to only the
highest bidder. 548 If so, it is unclear that such a proposal does not itself
suffer disutility by mandating to local governments what processes they
must use in awarding contracts to private parties. Indeed, such an argument
would constitute judicial intervention into legislative decision making-the
very thing Kelo forbids. 54 9 Without the competitive bidding requirement
that Kelly's test constructively imposes, proving pretext is made more
difficult, if not impossible. And because Kelly does not explain what
factors would prove pretext in situations involving new assemblies,
changed circumstance, or positive externalities, 550 it is unclear how his test
is an improvement over a flexible, multifactor process test that gives courts
a variety of tried-and-true tools to detect favoritism.
Taken to its logical conclusion, Kelly's standard may alter the outcome
in a case like Kelo; because it is now evident that New London railroaded a
competitive bidding process, 551 arguably Kelly's standard would have
required the Court to find pretext-an untenable outcome. Such an
outcome elucidates the real problem with a standard based on one factor.

543. See supra note 405 and accompanying text.
544. See supra notes 177, 438-45 and accompanying text.
545. See supra notes 458-65 and accompanying text.
546. See supra notes 363-65 and accompanying text.
547. See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
548. Such a proposal would contrast to RFPs in some contexts, where the party awarding
the contract may incorporate qualitative measures in determining the winner of the bid. See
supra note 361 (discussing how reviews of RFPs incorporate qualitative and quantitative
measures).
549. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
550. See supra note 466 and accompanying text.
551. See supra notes 139, 471 and accompanying text.
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Under a Kennedy process scrutiny approach, on the other hand, no single
factor governs. Rather, it is the cumulative weight of probative evidence of
favoritism that militates for finding pretext. Thus, if the only pretextual
factor in Kelo had been lack of competitve bidding, it seems that no court
would find pretext on the basis of that alone. And if that is true, then
Kelly's test gets us nowhere. What is needed is a multifactor test that is
used to infer actual purpose.
Finally, although Kelly denigrates motive analysis, his test uses some of
the same factors that a process scrutiny/motive test does-specifically, by
arguing that the availability of alternatives and the magnitude of benefits
are factors that support finding pretext certain. 552 And yet he draws the line
there, failing to consider other factors that may be relevant, like post hoc
determinations or legislative statements. 553 Ignoring such factors, which a
process test potentially could analyze, Kelly's test risks the very problem of
underinclusivity he warns against. The Court should not so disarm itself.
2. Using the Kennedy Factors to Infer Motive and Purpose
Process scrutiny reconciles a controversy in eminent domain law between
why governments are using this substantial power and the reason for which
they say they are using it. 554 Process scrutiny may ask questions similar to
those that means-ends analysis asks, 555 but it does so not to assess whether
the government act goes too far; 556 but whether the taking is so
disproportionate as to evince an ulterior motive. 557 Absent judicial
scrutiny, governments may simply go through the motions of asserting a
purpose, knowing that the taking-even if motivated by an illegitimate
purpose-will pass muster as long as a court can discern any conceivably
valid purpose. 558 A new rule sanctioning heightened scrutiny for pretext
claims gives weight to a constitutional right, potentially ending legislatures'
efforts to dupe citizens and the courts. 559 For critics like Justice O'Connor,
who believe that analyzing the purpose of a taking is senseless when the
result-relinquishing private property to another private party-is the
same, 560 no rule for reviewing pretext claims will ever satisfy their
concerns, which are directed at the validity of eminent domain for economic
development. Additionally, a purpose test may just be the next-best line of
552. See supra notes 463-65 and accompanying text.
553. See, e.g., supra notes 209, 239-41 (discussing the relevance of several factors-post
hoc justifications or actions, legislative statements, and sequence of events leading up to
condemnation-to pretext claims).
554. See supra notes 486-88 and accompanying text.
555. See supra note 399 and accompanying text.
556. See supra note 415.
557. See supra Part I.D.2.a (discussing Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727
A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998); In re 49 WB, LLC v. Vill. of Haverstraw, 839 N.Y.S.2d
127 (App. Div. 2007)).
558. See supra note 521 and accompanying text.
559. See supra note 517 and accompanying text.
560. See supra note 508.
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defense after Kelo. Given that the Court is not likely to reconsider the
holding in Kelo,56 1 it is up to the judiciary to craft the best solution for
protecting property rights.
This standard would authorize courts to strike down a proposed taking
for its actual purpose even if the project will or could conceivably produce a
legitimate public benefit. 562 Courts will strike the taking as long as
property owners show that, but for the influence of the illegitimate
consideration, the taking would not have occurred. 563 This rule operates by
examining a variety of facts and factors, and from them infers whether the
only rational conclusion is that the purpose of the taking was really to
benefit a private party. 564 Furthermore, in unmasking this purpose, courts
do not need to find evidence of a quid pro quo--that the condemning
authority was expecting a specific or discrete benefit from the private party
565
in return for its use of the eminent domain power.
Finally, this standard looks at legislative intent (and motive and purpose),
but does not examine what individual legislators personally believed the
taking was intended to accomplish or what they personally wanted it to
accomplish. 566 The test is a hybrid of objective and subjective analysis: to
the extent that legislative statements are evidenced, courts may examine it,
but they do not depose legislators in order to learn what they as individuals
hoped to achieve. 567 Pretext analysis requires looking at objective actsdeparture from normal proceedings, sequence of events, joint development
agreements, and official statements preceding a legislative vote-and, by
taking those acts and events in toto, permits courts to infer a purpose,
568
motive, intent, desire, or hope.
Courts should resist calls for framing process scrutiny as a
comprehensive plan test. 569 It is unclear from Cohen whether a
comprehensive plan test means that courts scrutinize the taking to see if the
process resulted in a comprehensive plan-and thus that it is beyond
reproach-or whether mere presence of a comprehensive plan means courts
will presume that it is not suspicious. 570 This formulation of process
scrutiny may be too narrow for the rule to reach its full potential. Some
scholars are concerned that a focus on a comprehensive plan risks creating a

561. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
562. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
563. See supra note 491 and accompanying text.
564. See supra Part I.D.1.b (discussing how courts infer purpose from a variety of factors
indicating pretext).
565. See supra Part I.D.l.c (discussing pretext case law where courts found pretext
without a finding of return of benefit to the condemning authority).
566. See supra note 210.
567. See supra notes 208-10.
568. See supra notes 198, 208-10 and accompanying text; see, e.g., supra note 226
(discussing a bad faith case where the condemning authority's intent was inferred from an
affirmative vote by legislators following statements of one legislator).
569. See supra notes 520-25 and accompanying text.
570. See supra note 520 (describing Cohen's discussion of a "comprehensive plan" test).
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safe harbor for officials. 571 If courts are limited to examining the
comprehensive plan and the proceedings to which it gives rise, they may
overlook important indicators of impermissible favoritism. 572 In fact, a
strictly-adhered-to comprehensive plan test may straitjacket courts in a
search for pretext. Such a narrow view might lead courts to miss
presence of failed
considering whether the benefits are de minimis, 5 73 or the
to negotiate. 574

negotiations, or whether there was a failure
Similarly, a narrow view might miss other evidence that could be
characterized as expansive, like the availability of alternatives to
condemnation. Presence of this factor suggests favoritism because if there
is a viable alternative to using eminent domain, avoiding using it seems to
indicate an ill motive. 575 What pretext case law reveals is that courts are
good at inferring pretext from a wide range of factors, 576 and that if they are
given a broad range of evidence to evaluate, they are better able to find
pretext. Cohen's analysis is not wrong, but it does pose certain risks;
without spelling out how courts may take cues about a flawed or broken
process, it is possible courts might interpret Cohen's rule too narrowly.
Taking an expansive view of the kinds of evidence courts should review
in ascertaining pretext is a way to both enforce constitutional protections of
private property and preserve the integrity of the political process.5 77 On
one hand, deference to legislatures leaves constitutional rights vulnerable to
myriad forms of abuse by legislatures. 578 On the other hand, a robust
pretext standard gives teeth to challenges that assert the political process is
being manipulated for someone's private gain. 579 Citizens emerge with
Similarly, would-be private
stronger protections for their property.
beneficiaries, like Costco in 99 Cents, will have to answer to the law if they
try to use their influence to hijack the political process. 580 Applying this
heightened standard for pretext claims also means that the legislative
571. See supra note 521 and accompanying text (noting Cohen's criticism of a
"comprehensive plan rule" for its susceptibility to creating a safe harbor for abuse); see also
Garnett, supra note 83, at 454 ("[G]overnment officials will view planning as a
constitutional safe harbor and private litigants will consider lack of planning a constitutional
red flag.").
572. See supra Part I.D. Albeit, one could argue that the two factors discussed in Part
I.D. that Justice Kennedy did not mention-(1) the availability of alternatives to
condemnation and (2) failed negotiations-might fit into a comprehensive plan test or fit

under the rubric of "procedural irregularity" discussed in Justice Kennedy's concurrence. See
supra notes 130, 194 and accompanying text.
573. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
574. See supra Part I.D.2.c.
575. See supra Part I.D.2.b.
576. See, e.g., supra notes 254-56 (discussing In re 49 WB v. Village of Haverstraw, 839
N.Y.S.2d 127 (App. Div. 2007), in which the court uncovered a complex scheme to benefit a
private party at the expense of the condemned property owner).
577. See supra notes 516-17 and accompanying text.
578. See supra notes 66-84 and accompanying text.
579. See supra Part I.D.l.a.
580. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit's
invalidation of a taking on behalf of Costco).
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process will not be so easily corrupted by parties and condemning1
58
authorities who develop complex schemes to take private property,
restoring integrity to the political process. It potentially secures the longcherished constitutional promise that A's property may not be taken to
enrich B. 582 It bolsters public trust in the law-making branch and
administrative offices, which in5 turn
is the basis for trusting in a system that
83
defers to legislative judgments.
B. PleadingPretext and PleadingStandard
This Note does not suggest where courts should come down on the
debate over applying Twombly's plausibility pleading standard or Conley's
notice pleading standard. 584 However, which standard a court chooses may
reflect an underlying attitude toward pretext claims. 585 Courts like the
Second Circuit in Goldstein may be resistant to giving weight to Justice
Kennedy's concurrence out of fear that doing so will open the floodgates to
more litigation. 586 This fear raises the question whether such courts even
accept the premise of a pretext claim altogether. Framed as the Second
Circuit framed it-that plaintiffs need to allege that the asserted purpose of
the project is egregious 587-confounds a pretext standard with a rationality
standard. A Goldstein pretext standard would obviate the need for a pretext
claim altogether, because a taking that met that standard could be struck
down on rational basis grounds anyway. 588 Regardless of the pleading
standard courts apply, what courts should recognize is that the core tension
with regard to pretext-between deference to legislative judgments about
valid purpose and judicial scrutiny of illegitimate motives-can be
resolved, and that it should be resolved in favor of hearing pretext

581. See, e.g., supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text (discussing In re 49 WB);
supra notes 166 (discussing Armendariz).
582. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
583. See supra note 519 and accompanying text.
584. See supra Part II.A. 1 (discussing the split between the Second Circuit and the D.C.
Court of Appeals on the issue of applying Twombly or Conley to pretext claims).
585. See supra notes 311-12 and accompanying text.
586. See supra Part II.A.1. If the Second Circuit really does assume that Justice
Kennedy's factors govern, then it should be irrelevant that New York State provides relief
from such a requirement; to do otherwise would subvert the notion that Kelo set the floor for
constitutional rights under the Takings Clause and not the ceiling. See supra note 64 and
accompanying text. Goldstein's treatment of this factor would suggest it has gone beneath
the floor. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (federal constitutional protections set the
minimum below which private property rights may not be violated).
587. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984)) (explaining how a taking that alleged "egregious" acts
would trigger heightened scrutiny); see also supra notes 159-61 (discussing regulations
which fail under rational basis review).
588. See supra Part I.C.
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claims. 589 This is precisely what the Franco court found. 59 0 In doing so, it
59 1
honored the concerns the Court expressed in Kelo.
Pretext claims are highly dependent on discovery precisely because
592
legislatures have an incentive to hide facts so as to conceal their motive.
Indeed, even in Kelo, an extensive inquiry did not succeed in producing all
available information that might have sustained a pretext claim. 5 93 In light
of this anecdote, the substantive dimensions of permitting pretext claims to
go to discovery are stark: without the evidence produced in discovery,
many pretext claims may not get very far in court. 594 For this reason, and
because constitutional rights are at stake, courts should err on the side of
hearing pretext claims. Granted, conclusory allegations should not be
enough, but when plaintiffs raise factual allegations that fit the profile of
pretext, they should not be dismissed on the pleadings. Furthermore,
evidence of the full story in Kelo may not have swayed the court anyway,
but the point is that potentially critical information, even if it is a type that
plaintiffs cannot imagine, may come to light in discovery.
This is exactly what happened in Goldstein.595 An analysis of that case
reveals that the Second Circuit may have applied Twombly precisely
because it sought to avoid hearing a pretext claim-just as courts applying
Twombly in other contexts do so for various policy reasons. 596 It did not
matter that the plaintiffs actually pled factual allegations that fit the profile
of a pretext claim, because the court, in hiding behind a plausibility
pleading standard, may not have wanted to review these claims in the first
place. 597 Hence, the Goldstein plaintiffs' obstacle to getting to discovery
may not have been caused by the choice of pleading standard-though a
more liberal pleading standard would probably ensure that more pretext
claims get to discovery, 59 8 Rather, the obstacle was the Second Circuit's
deep resistance to scrutinizing claims that it discerned undermine the
Court's decision in Kelo, a fear that underpinned its dismissal of the pretext
claim. 599 Addressing this attitude is more important in giving substantive
weight to pretext claims than is mandating that courts apply a particular
pleading standard. If, in a future decision, the Court makes clear that it
intended to create a new rule, the underlying concerns of the Goldstein
court 600 fall away; instead of a response like in Goldstein, courts will be
589. See, e.g., supra note 385 and accompanying text.
590. See supra notes 383-84 and accompanying text.
591. See supra Part I.C (discussing the Court's call for application of heightened scrutiny
for claims alleging impermissible favoritism).
592. See supra note 383 and accompanying text.
593. See supra note 27.
594. See, e.g., supra Part II.A (discussing Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir.
2008)).
595. See supra Part II.A.
596. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
597. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
598. See, e.g., Part.II.A.1.
599. See supra Part II.A.2.a (discussing the narrow view of pretext claims).
600. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
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receptive to such claims, 60 1 like they were in Franco and numerous other
60 2
state and federal cases.
CONCLUSION

Although Justice Kennedy's concurrence opened the door to pretext
claims, Kelo's reaffirmance of a rational basis test sent an opposing signal,
leaving courts little room to invalidate takings under the Public Use Clause.
The danger of such a holding is that courts will read deference as an
indication that they must retreat to the "borders" of judicial review, no
matter the degree of the stench of favoritism.
Fear of judicial retreat was confirmed in Goldstein. The Goldstein
plaintiffs claimed that the developer, Ratner, was getting a sweetheart deal
that came at the expense of the public interest, and which led to the taking
of private homes. By confusing Kelo's call for deferential review with an
absolute bar on scrutiny for anything other than an egregious taking, the
Court dismissed plaintiffs' pretext claims, denying them discovery and a
chance to build their case. The Goldstein court's application of the
Twombley standard evinced its hostility toward and disdain of pretext
claims; it dismissed the case not because the facts plaintiffs alleged were
insufficient, but because the court was deeply skeptical of the validity of
pretext claims altogether. The outcome in Goldstein is exactly what Justice
Kennedy sought to warn against in his concurrence.
However, Justice Kennedy's acknowledgment of a possible standard skin
to a process scrutiny approach provides future courts with the tools to
ensure that the taking is truly public. That test evaluates a variety of
factors-mostly objective circumstantial evidence-to infer purpose.
Application of this standard in numerous decisions demonstrates that it is a
tried-and-true tool. The principle underlying these decisions is a fullbodied defense of the Public Use Clause. No matter what the asserted
purpose-however reasonable it appears on the surface-if the intended
benefit is private then the purpose is no longer public. Process scrutiny of
pretext thus holds the potential to reverse the trend of abuse of the eminent
domain power. By ferreting out favoritism, and thereby restoring faith in
the legislative process, the Court would lend credit and trust to the very
legislative process to which its decision in Kelo deferred.
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